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Abstract
This paper analyzes a steady state matching model interrelating
the education and labor sectors. In this model, a heterogeneous popu-
lation of students match with teachers to enhance their cognitive skills.
As adults, they then choose to become workers, managers, or teachers,
who match in the labor or educational market to earn wages by pro-
ducing output. We study the competitive equilibrium which results
from the steady state requirement that the educational process repli-
cate the same endogenous distribution of cognitive skills among adults
in each generation (assuming the same distribution of student skills).
We show such an equilibrium can be found by solving an infinite-
dimensional linear program and its dual. We analyze the structure
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of our solutions, and give sufficient conditions for them to be unique.
Whether or not the educational matching is positive assortative turns
out to depend on convexity of the equilibrium wages as a function
of ability, suitably parameterized; we identity conditions which imply
this convexity. Moreover, due to the recursive nature of the educa-
tion market, it is a priori conceivable that a pyramid scheme leads to
greater and greater discrepancies in the wages of the most talented
teachers at the top of the market. Assuming each teacher teaches N
students, and contributes a fraction θ ∈]0, 1[ to their cognitive skill, we
show a phase transition occurs at Nθ = 1, which determines whether
or not the wage gradients of these teachers remain bounded as market
size grows, and make a quantitative prediction for their asymptotic
behaviour in both regimes: Nθ ≥ 1 and Nθ < 1.
1 Introduction
It is an economic truism that prices are determined primarily by what the
market will bear. For example, executive compensations in large firms may
appear excessive when measured against average employee wages, but are
often justified by arguing that they are determined competitively by the
market. To understand what levels of compensation a large market will or
won’t bear, it is therefore tempting to ask questions such as: Can the ratio
of the CEO’s wages over the average wage in a firm be expected to tend to
infinity or a finite limit, as the size of the firm grows without bound? The
answer to such a question may be expected to depend on various aspects
of the organization of the firm, such as the number of levels of management
separating the CEO from the average worker, and the number of managers at
each level. This organizational structure may itself be determined by market
pressures — within the constraints of feasible technology.
In this paper we investigate an analogous question set in the context of
the education market, rather than that of a firm. That is, we investigate
how the wages of the most sought after gurus relate to those of the average
teacher. The education market is special in various ways. It is stratified
into many different levels or streams which interact with each other, with a
range of qualities available in every stream. Moreover, what it produces is
human capital, the value of which is determined by the broader market for
2
skills of which the education market is itself a small part. Thus there is a
feedback mechanism in the education market, owing to the fact that those
individuals who choose to become teachers participate at least twice in the
market: first as consumers and later as producers, putting to work the skills
previously acquired in this market to generate human capital for the next
generation. It is this feedback mechanism which is responsible for many of
the results we describe; it leads to the formation of an educational analog for
a pyramid scheme, in which teachers at each level of the pyramid attempt to
extract as much as they can from their students future earnings, in the form
of tuition. The question this time is whether or not the large market limit
leads to wages which display singularities at the apex of the pyramid.
We address this question using a variant of a steady state matching model
introduced by four of us to analyze the coupling of the education and labor
markets [16]. We proposed this model not only to provide a microeconomic
foundation which allows to compare and contrast different sectors, but to
examine interdependencies and the different roles played by communication
and cognitive skills in each of them. An unexpected conclusion was that —
as in much simpler (single stage, single sector) models [18] [10] [4], competi-
tive equilibrium matching patterns for a heterogeneous steady state popula-
tion can be found as the optimal solution to a planner’s problem taking the
form of a linear program; see also [5]. The questions raised in the present
manuscript will be addressed through a rigorous analysis of the resulting lin-
ear program and its solutions, including criteria for existence, uniqueness,
singularities, and a detailed description of the matching patterns which can
arise. A remarkable feature is that this simple model leads to the emergence
of a hierarchical structure in the education sector, with fewer and fewer indi-
viduals at the top of the market earning higher and higher wages. A detailed
exploration of this structure proves necessary to resolve the question of under
what conditions these wages turn out to display singularities. An analogous
hierarchy was explored by Becker and Murphy in the context of a steady
growth model [2, §VII] quite different from ours.
The education market is also unusual in many ways that our model does
not capture. For example, non-pecuniary considerations are important for
both teachers and students, and schools are often not operated on a for-
profit basis; however, in our model we assume all participants maximize
their expected monetary payoff. In addition, education markets (tuitions,
for example) are heavily regulated, but here we abstract away all regulation
restrictions. The goal of this paper, therefore, is not to provide a realistic
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account of how teachers’ compensations are determined in the market, but
rather to elucidate a feedback mechanism that is potentially important in de-
termining wage compensation in education and other markets, and to provide
a tool to solve matching models that incorporate this feedback mechanism
with the potential to encompass multi-dimensional individual attributes.
In the present model, we assume that the communication skills are ho-
mogeneous over the entire population, hence deal with a population having a
single dimension of heterogeneity plus parameters, rather than the multiple
dimensions of heterogeneity in [16]. Hence, the model here can be viewed as a
limiting case of multidimensional models in which the range of heterogeneities
becomes narrow in all dimensions but one. There are two benefits from this
simplifying assumption. First, it greatly simplifies our analysis. Second, the
resulting model is a minimal departure from the classical matching model
of one dimension of heterogeneity. We will show that this small departure
actually generates results very different from the standard one-dimensional
models of e.g. Lucas [12] or Garicano [8].
As in [16], we model communication skills as the number of students a
teacher can teach or the number of workers a manager can manage, which
is often referred to as “span of control”. In particular, we assume that each
teacher can teach N > 1 students. We use θ ∈]0, 1[ to represent the extent
to which a teacher’s cognitive skills get transmitted to each of their students.
Similarly, N ′ > 0 and θ′ ∈]0, 1[ represent the number of workers each man-
ager can manage in the labor market, and the extent to which a manager’s
cognitive skill enhances the productivity of his or her workers. All market
participants have the same N in the education market and the same N ′ in
the labor market, but they differ in the cognitive skills k which are assumed
to be continuously distributed over the interval K¯ := [k, k¯] ⊂ R. As a result,
the linear program is infinite-dimensional, and the analysis is complicated
by a lack of a priori bounds which could be used to show that equilibrium
wages or payoffs exist for the model. Moreover, a pyramid can form in the
education sector, enhancing the wages of the most skilled teachers. It is not
obvious whether or not this pyramid structure can lead to unbounded wage
behavior. Our analysis suggests it does not, but leads to unbounded wage
gradients instead.
We begin by elucidating a convexity property which allows us to derive
the existence of equilibrium wages as solutions to an (infinite-dimensional)
linear program. This convexity is reminiscent of that discussed by Rosen
in his investigation of superstars [17]. More surprisingly, after addressing
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uniqueness and properties of these wages and the matches they induce, we
go on to show that the model exhibits a phase transition, depending on
the product of each teacher’s capacity N for students times their teaching
effectiveness θ: the wage gradients diverge at the highest skill type if and only
if Nθ ≥ 1. When Nθ > 1, the divergence is proportional to |k¯− k|−
log θ
logN
−1 as
k → k¯. Only by integrating this divergence can we conditionally show wages
tend to a finite limit at k¯ which — in the large market limit — becomes
independent of the size of the population being modelled.
Although wage singularies for teachers may appear counter-factual, or at
least modest compared to wage singularities for managers in the real world,
this discrepancy between prediction and observation is easily explained by
the fact that our model allows for only one layer of managers but a potentially
unbounded number of layers of teachers. Thus a top teacher improves the
cognitive skills of each of their N students who go on to be top teachers or
managers. A good manager improves the productivity of each of their N ′
supervised workers. Thus, already in a two-layer hierarchy, a top teacher
indirectly makes a large number N ×N ′ of workers more productive. Since
the number of layers of the educational hierarchy is endogenous to the model
and can be very large, the impact of gurus on the productivity of their direct
and indirect students and workers can accumulate very substantially.
The term phase transition is borrowed from statistical physics, where it
refers to a sharp threshold in parameters (such as temperature) separating
qualitatively different behavior (such as liquid from solid). In that context,
the non-smoothness arises from a continuum limit which admits approxima-
tion by finite dimensional models depending smoothly on the same parame-
ter(s). By analogy, if our continuum of agent types could be approximated
using finitely many agent types, we would expect to restore smooth depen-
dence on the parameters N and θ, but this smoothness (i.e. the wage gradi-
ents) would not admit control uniform in the number of types. In statistical
physics, it is often the case that the critical exponents of the singularities
(such as log θ
logN
above) do not vary over a wide class of models, a phenomenon
known as universality. In the present context, we observe that the exponent
log θ
logN
governing growth of the wage gradients is universal in the sense that it
does not depend on various details of the model, such as the exact form of
the production functions, or the input distribution of student skills, at least
within the classes of such data considered hereafter.
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows. In the first sec-
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tion and subsections we lay out the model, and its variational reformulation
in terms of a planner’s problem and its dual. We have argued in [16] that
solutions to these infinite-dimensional linear programs represent competive
equilibria; see also the announcement [15]. In a second section and subsec-
tions we address the existence, uniqueness and properties of these solutions.
Even the existence of equilibrium wages in this model is rather non-trivial,
and goes beyond the range of validity of any statement of the second wel-
fare theorem that we know. Standard arguments concerning existence of
an optimal matching and absence of a duality gap are relegated to an ap-
pendix, which is logically independent of the rest of the analysis. Lemma 14
is also logically independent of the remaining analysis, and its first assertion
is actually required at some earlier points in the text.
1.1 The model: competitive equilibria
Let us begin by describing our unidimensional variant of the model first in-
troduced by [16]. Consider an economy populated by risk-neutral individuals
who each lives for two periods. Individuals, when they are young, enter the
education market as students. In the subsequent period as adults, they en-
ter the labor market to become teachers in schools, or workers or managers
in firms. Both the education market and the labor market are competitive.
There is free entry for both schools and firms. Hence, the tuition fees a
school collects from students are just enough to cover the wage of its teacher,
and a firm’s output exactly covers the wages of its employees (workers and
mangers). All individuals do not discount. The lifetime net payoffs of in-
dividuals are equal to the sum of their labor market plus non-labor market
earnings minus tuition costs. Individuals choose what occupation to pursue
and who to match with in each of the two markets to maximize their net
payoffs.
Each individual is endowed with two kinds of skills, a communication skill
(N > 1 or N ′ > 1) which is fixed throughout their lifetime, and an initial
cognitive skill a which can be augmented through education. As in [16], we
assume that individuals differ in their initial cognitive skills a. In contrast
to [16], we assume that individuals share the same communication skills. By
attending schools in the first period, individuals can augment their initial
cognitive skills a to their adult cognitive skill k. Let A = [a, a¯[ with −∞ <
a < a¯ < +∞ denote the range of students’ initial cognitive skills a, and
K = [k, k¯[ or rather its closure K¯ the range of adult human capital k. Ability
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or human capital refers to cognitive skill in both cases, and we occasionally
use the variable names a and k interchangeably for convenience. For the
model discussed here, taking K = A will not cost any generality, nor will the
normalization a = k = 0.
The production functions in the education market and in the labor market
are described as follows. We assume the cognitive skill z(a, k) acquired by a
student of ability a ∈ A who studies with a teacher of ability k ∈ K is given
by the weighted average z(a, k) = (1− θ)a+ θk of their abilities, with weight
θ ∈]0, 1[. We also assume the productivity bL((1 − θ
′)a + θ′k) of a worker
with adult cognitive skill a supervised by a manager of skill k is given by a
convex increasing function bL ∈ C
1
(
K¯
)
of another such average, this time
with weight θ′ ∈]0, 1[. Notice that abilities a and k here are measured on
a logarithmic scale relative to the conventions of [16], a reparameterization
which is crucial for exposing the sense in which the equilibrium wages may
turn out to be convex.
We allow for the possibility that cognitive skill z attained through edu-
cation has value cbE(z) in addition to the wage earning potential it confers,
where c ≥ 0 is a dimensionless parameter and bE ∈ C
1(A) is another convex
increasing function. The choice bE(k) = e
k = bL(k) with θ =
1
2
= θ′ corre-
sponds to the motivating example from [16]; more generally we assume bE
and bL and their first two derivatives have positive lower bounds
0 < bE/L = bE/L(0) (1)
0 < b′E/L = b
′
E/L(0) (2)
0 < b′′E/L = inf
k
b′′E/L(k), (3)
where b′′E/L is defined as the largest constant for which bE/L(k)− b
′′
E/L|k|
2/2
is convex on K¯. We hope strict positivity of the analogous quantities will be
inherited by the equilibrium payoffs u and v.
Notice that what is being produced in each sector is different: in the
labor and non-labor sectors we have not specified the service or goods which
are being produced, except that they take adult cognitive skills as their
input (communication skills entering through possible dependence of c on
parameters such as N and θ); in the education sector it is adult cognitive
skills which are being produced, taking student and teacher cognitive skills
as their inputs. The dimensionless constant c ≥ 0 measures the non-labor
utility, if any, of individual attainment of cognitive skills relative to labor
productivity; it replaces the marital utility used in early drafts of [16].
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Let a probability measure α ≥ 0 on A¯ represent the exogenous distribu-
tion of student abilities, and let sptα denote the smallest closed subset of
A¯ carrying the full mass of α. Taking A smaller if necessary ensures sptα
contains both a and a¯. Our problem is to find a pair Borel measures ǫ ≥ 0 on
A¯× K¯ and λ ≥ 0 on K¯ × K¯, such that ǫ represents the educational pairing
of students with teachers, and λ represents the labor pairing of workers with
managers, along with a pair of payoffs or wage functions u, v : K¯ −→ [0,∞]
representing the net lifetime expected utility u(a) of a student with ability
a, and the wage v(k) paid to an adult of ability k, which together consti-
tute a competitive equilibrium (ǫ, λ, u, v). Roughly speaking, this means the
matchings ǫ, λ must clear the market at each generation in a steady-state,
and the payoffs u and v must be large enough to be stable, yet small enough
that in combination with (ǫ, λ) they satisfy a budget constraint.
Since we are interested in a steady state model, we assume the distribution
of student abilities α on A¯ is the same at each generation, and coincides with
the left marginal
ǫ1 = α (4)
of the educational pairing ǫ ≥ 0 of student and teacher abilities. Here ǫ1 =
π1#ǫ and ǫ
2 = π2#ǫ denote the left and right projections of ǫ through π
1(a, k) =
a and π2(a, k) = k, representing the respective distributions of student and
teacher abilities. Similarly λ1 and λ2 will denote the left and right marginals
of the labor pairing λ, representing the distribution of worker and manager
skills. The steady state constraint requires that the educational pairing ǫ of
students with adults reproduce the current distribution of adult skills at the
next generation:
λ1 +
1
N ′
λ2 +
1
N
ǫ2 = z#ǫ, (5)
where the expression on the left represents the sum of the current distribu-
tions of worker, manager and teacher skills; the latter have been scaled by
N ′ and N respectively, to reflect the fact that each manager manages N ′
workers, and each teacher teaches N students, so comparatively fewer man-
agers and teachers are required. The symbol κ := z#ǫ on the right represents
the distribution of future adult skills resulting from the educational pairing
ǫ; it is given by the push-forward of ǫ through the map z : A¯ × K¯ −→ K¯
representing the educational technology, and assigns mass κ[B] := ǫ[z−1(B)]
to each set B ⊂ K¯.
The marginal constraint (4) forces ǫ and hence κ = z#ǫ to be probability
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measures, like α. The workers form a fraction (1 − 1
N
)/(1 + 1
N ′
) of the pop-
ulation, coinciding with the total mass of λ. The restriction K = A costs no
generality, since we are in a steady state, and since our education technology
satisfies z(a, a) = a, whence z(a, k) = k and z(a¯, k¯) = k¯.
Letting v(k) denote the wage commanded by an adult of skill k, and u(a)
the net lifetime utility of a student of ability a, both must satisfy the stability
conditions
u(a) +
1
N
v(k) ≥ cbE(z(a, k)) + v(z(a, k)) and (6)
v(a) +
1
N ′
v(k) ≥ bL((1− θ
′)a+ θ′k) on A¯× K¯. (7)
The constraint (7) enforces stability of matchings in the labor sector. If the
reverse inequality held, N ′ adults with skills a and one with skill k would
abandon their occupations to form N ′ worker-manager pairs each producing
enough output bL to improve all N
′ + 1 adults’ wages. Similarly (6) is a
stable matching condition for the education sector. The lifetime net utility
of a student with cognitive skill a plus the tuition v(k)/N paid by each
student of a teacher with skill k must exceed a’s lifetime earnings plus any
other benefits derived from cognitive skills which would have resulted had
he (and N − 1 of his clones) chosen to study with k. We can also regard
the stability constraints (6)–(7) as combining to ensure each adult of type k
in the population chooses the profession (worker, manager, or teacher) and
partners (manager, workers, or students, respectively) which maximize their
wage v(k) on the labor market.
Finally, the budget constraint asserts that equality holds ǫ-a.e. in (6),
and λ-a.e. in (7). In other words, the productivity bL((1 − θ
′)a + θ′k) of
λ-a.e. manager-worker pair (a, k) which actually forms is sufficient to pay
the worker’s wage plus a fraction 1/N ′ of the manager’s salary. Similarly, ǫ-
a.e. student-teacher pairing (a, k) which forms must produce an adult whose
earnings v(z(a, k)), supplemented by any additional utility cbE(z(a, k)) de-
rived from the skill z(a, k) he acquires, must add up to the net lifetime utility
which remains to the student after paying tuition equal to his share v(k)/N
of his teacher’s earnings.
To complete the specification of the model, we need to say in what class of
functions the payoffs u, v must lie. Since we wish to allow for the possibility
that the payoffs u, v : K −→ [0,∞] become unbounded at the upper end
k¯ of the skill range, it is convenient to define A = K = [0, k¯[ as a half
9
open interval. We shall consider payoffs from the feasible set F0 consisting of
pairs (u, v) = (u0 + u1, v0 + v1) satisfying (6)–(7) which differ from bounded
continuous functions u0, v0 ∈ C(A¯) by non-decreasing functions u1, v1 : A¯ −→
[0,∞]. If v takes extended real values, we also require
N
N−1
(u(k)− cbE(k)) ≥ v(k) ≥
N ′
N ′+1
bL(k) > 0 on K¯, (8)
which otherwise follows from a = k in (6)–(7). We often require u and v to
be proper, meaning lower semicontinuous and not identically infinite. This
costs little generality, since when (6)–(8) hold for non-negative functions
(u, v), they continue to if u and v are replaced by their lower semicontinuous
hulls.
A competitive equilibrium refers to a pair of measures ǫ, λ ≥ 0 and func-
tions (u, v) ∈ F0 satisfying (4)–(8) plus the budget constraint
equality holds ǫ-a.e. in (6), and λ-a.e. in (7) (9)
relating (ǫ, λ) to (u, v). The economic idea behind this definition is that no
individual agent (nor any group of agents which is small relative to the size of
the market) can improve their outcome by choosing to match otherwise than
as prescribed by ǫ and λ. Here ǫ represents an assignment of N students
to each teacher, and reproduces the current distribution of adult skills in
the next generation, starting from the given distribution α of student skills
and educational technology z(a, k) = (1− θ)a+ θk; the future earnings plus
any non-labor utility received by the N students exactly add up to their net
lifetime utilities, plus the salary of the teacher. Similarly, λ represents an
assignment of N ′ workers to each manager, the productivity of these worker-
manager teams exactly sufficing to pay the respective wages of each team
member. Both the educational and the labor markets clear, and the stability
constraints guarantee no adult would prefer an occupation other than the
one he or she has been assigned, nor to work with anyone other than the
partners prescribed by (a, k) ∈ spt λ in the case of workers or managers, or
by ǫ in the case of teachers. Similarly, each pair (a, k) ∈ spt ǫ represents a
student of ability a, who cannot improve his net lifetime payoff by training
with any teacher other than the one of skill k that he is paired with under ǫ.
1.2 The planner’s problem and its dual
Shapley and Shubik’s basic insight is that stable matching problems with
transferable utility have a variational reformulation using linear programs
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and their duals. In [16] we observe that this insight extends from the familiar
single-stage, single-sector setting of [18] [10] and [4], to steady-state multi-
sector models such as the one introduced above. Denoting our education
and labor market technologies by bθ(a, k) = bE((1− θ)a+ θk) and b
′
θ′(a, k) =
bL((1− θ
′)a+ θ′k), the quartuple (ǫ, λ, u, v) forms a competitive equilibrium
if and only if (u, v) attain the infimum
LP∗ := inf
(u,v)∈F0
∫
[0,a¯]
u(a)α(da) (10)
over (6)–(8), while (ǫ, λ) attain the supremum
LP ∗ := max
ǫ≥0 and λ≥0 on [0,a¯]2
satisfying (4)−(5)
∫
[0,a¯]×[0,k¯]
[cb′θ′(a, k)ǫ(da, dk) + bθ(a, k)λ(da, dk)]. (11)
We shall henceforth refer to (u, v) ∈ F0 as optimal if it attains the infimum
(10), and to (ǫ, λ) as optimal if it attains the supremum (11). Whereas the
notion of competitive equilibrium relates (u, v) to (ǫ, λ) through (9), one
can discuss optimality of (u, v) without referring to (ǫ, λ), and vice-versa.
This is the first of many advantages conferred by our Shapley-Shubik-like
reformation of the problem at hand.
We often use α(u) as a shorthand notation to denote the integral ap-
pearing in (10), which represents the average student’s net lifetime utility.
Similarly, cǫ(bθ) + λ(b
′
θ′) denotes the argument appearing in the supremum
(11), and represents the total (non-labor + labor) utility produced by the
pairings ǫ and λ. Thus if equilibrium wages (u, v) ∈ F0 exist, they minimize
the expected lifetime utility of students subject to the stability constraints.
Similarly, any equilibrium matches maximize the utility cǫ(bθ) + λ(b
′
θ′) being
produced our model’s two sectors in each generation, subject to the market-
clearing constraints (4)–(5) in steady-state. The latter can be interpreted as
a social planner’s problem; it is also the linear program dual to (10). Sat-
isfaction of the budget constraint (9) follows from the absence of a duality
gap: the fact LP∗ = LP
∗, which is established below under the technical hy-
pothesis that α satisfy a doubling condition at the top skill type a¯, meaning
there exists C <∞ such that∫
[a¯−2∆a,a¯]
α(da) ≤ C
∫
[a¯−∆a,a¯]
α(da) (12)
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for all ∆a > 0. A surprisingly delicate part of the proof is the inequal-
ity LP ∗ ≤ LP∗ shown in Proposition 8; the rest of the duality argument
reproduced in Appendix A is quite standard.
The variational characterization given by (10)–(11) is our starting point
for the further analysis for the payoffs (u, v) and matchings (ǫ, λ) we seek. To
show such competitive equilibria exist, it is enough to establish the infimum
and supremum are attained. Attainment of the planner’s supremum is stan-
dard, as recalled in Appendix A. It is less straightforward to show that the
infimum (10) is attained, and to elucidate the properties of the extremizers
for either problem. A continuity and compactness argument is complicated
by the fact that the wage function v appears on both sides of the educa-
tion sector stability constraint, and has no obvious upper bound except in
L1(A¯, α); c.f. (8).
When minimizers (u, v) exist, it is useful to know as much structural
information as we can about them, in order to analyze the properties of the
corresponding equilibrium matches. In the cases for which we have been
able to deduce the existence of minimizers, they turn out to be non-negative,
non-decreasing, convex functions of a ∈ [0, a¯]. The fact that the monotonicity
and convexity of u and v survive limits is crucial to the analysis. Indeed,
our existence strategy is to first show (10) is minimized under the additional
assumption of convexity and monotonicity for u and v, and then to show
that this additional constraint does not bind for the minimizing (u, v), which
must therefore optimize the original problem of interest. In the absence of
an atom at the top skill type, α[{k¯}] = 0, it seems possible a priori that
both u(k) and v(k) diverge to +∞ as k → k¯, without violating boundedness
of the expected value LP∗ = α(u). Although Theorem 16 tends to rule out
this possibility, giving conditions instead for the gradients u′(a) and v′(k) to
diverge, for the intermediate analysis it is useful to let A = [0, k¯[= K denote
a half-open interval where we can assume u and v are real valued.
In addition to (N, θ) and (N ′, θ′), dimensionless parameters such as b¯′L/b
′
L ≥
1 and c ≥ 0 govern the behavior displayed by the model. Here b′L is from (2)
and
b¯′E/L = b
′
E/L(k¯) = sup
k∈K
b′E/L(k)
so b¯′L/b
′
L indexes the relative impact of an increase in skill on labor produc-
tivity at the top versus the bottom of the skills market, while c measures the
relative importance of any other satisfactions derived from cognitive skills
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apart from the returns to labor which they help to enhance. Such satisfac-
tions could be intrinsic, or they could represent externalities that cognitive
skills and education provide, such as social status or — as in early drafts of
[16] — marital prospects. We can also remove this effect from the model by
setting c = 0. However, to implement the existence strategy outlined above,
it turns out to be technically easier to analyze the case c > 0 first, and then
take the limit c → 0 if desired. Many but not all of our structural results
such as uniqueness, specialization, and positive assortativity also survive this
limit; see Proposition 7 and Theorem 15 for example.
We shall also investigate occupational specialization by cognitive skill,
showing min{N ′θ′, Nθ} ≥ b¯′L/b
′
L implies that the highest types become teach-
ers, while the lowest types become either workers or teachers, but not man-
agers. More refined statements appear in Proposition 7. For continuously
distributed skill types, we show that a pyramid can form in the education
sector, sometimes leading to divergence of wage gradients at the highest skill
type when Nθ ≥ 1, meaning the span of control at each node in the pyra-
mid is large enough. More explicitly, under suitable conditions Theorem 16
asserts that as k → k¯,
v′(k) ∼
{
const|k¯ − k|−1−
log θ
logN for Nθ > 1,
cb¯′E/(
1
Nθ
− 1) for Nθ < 1,
so a phase transition occurs at Nθ = 1. A less involved investigation of
an analogous pyramid structure was given by Becker and Murphy [2, §VII],
in a different production model incorporating the cost of acquiring knowl-
edge and assuming steady-growth as opposed to steady-state. To produce a
similar pyramid in the labor sector, our model would need to be modified
to permit managers to manage other managers — as in Garicano [8] with
Rossi-Hansberg [9] — instead of being forced to manage only workers whose
productivity is inherently limited. If such a modification to our model could
be achieved, it would have the potential to complement existing models for
executive compensation such as Gabaix and Landier’s [6], which rely instead
on comparing given tail behaviors of the distributions of company size and
managerial talent.
Finally, Corollary 9 characterizes the optimizers in the primal and dual
problems (10)–(11). Theorem 15 provides sufficient conditions for uniqueness
of (ǫ, λ), and discusses in what sense (u, v) are also unique. It gives condi-
tions guaranteeing the optimal pairings λ of workers with managers and ǫ
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of teachers with students are positive assortative in cognitive skills, meaning
spt λ and spt ǫ are non-decreasing subsets of the plane. This monotonicity is
intimately tied to the convexity of wages v as a function of k ∈ [0, k¯] asserted
above.
2 Analysis
2.1 Terminology and notation
In this section, we introduce terminology and notation that will be useful for
dealing with functions which need neither be smooth nor bounded, and with
the measures which arise naturally as their duals.
Given any convex set B ⊂ Rn, a function u : B −→ R ∪ {+∞} is said
to be continuous if it is upper and lower semicontinuous. It is said to be
Lipschitz with Lipschitz constant L if either u is identically infinity or else if
L := sup
B∋x 6=y∈B
|u(x)− u(y)|
|x− y|
is finite. It is said to be semiconvex with semiconvexity constant C if the
function x ∈ B 7−→ u(x)+C|x|2/2 is convex. It is said to be locally Lipschitz
(respectively semiconvex) on B, if u is Lipschitz (respectively semiconvex)
on every compact convex subset of B. Locally Lipschitz (respectively semi-
convex) functions are once (respectively twice) differentiable Lebesgue a.e.
In addition, locally semiconvex functions fail to be once differentiable on a
set of Hausdorff dimension at most n− 1.
By support of a Borel measure α ≥ 0 on Rm, we mean the smallest
closed subset sptα ⊂ Rm of full mass: α[Rm \ sptα] = 0. The push-forward
f#α of α through a Borel map f : R
m −→ Rn is a Borel measure defined by
(f#α)[Z] = α[f
−1(Z)] for each Z ⊂ Rn. We say α has no atoms if α[{x}] = 0
for each x ∈ Rm. A measure ǫ on R2 is said to be positive assortative if spt ǫ
forms a non-decreasing subset in the plane: i.e. if (a′ − a)(k′ − k) ≥ 0 for all
(a, k), (a′, k′) ∈ spt ǫ. We use α|B to denote the restriction α|B(Z) = α[Z∩B]
of α to B ⊂ Rm, and Hn to denote Lebesgue measure on Rn.
2.2 The educational pyramid
In this section, we discuss the extent to which we can expect optimizers
(u, v) to the minimization (10) to be smooth, at least away from the top skill
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type k¯. We then apply these results to elucidate the nature of the pyramid
structure which can form in the education sector.
Given (u, v) ∈ F0 feasible for the infimum (10), use b
′
θ′(k
′, k) := bL((1 −
θ′)k′ + θ′k) and z(a, k) = (1 − θ)a + θk to define the wages implicitly avail-
able to an individual of cognitive skill k employed as a worker, manager, or
teacher, respectively:
vw(k) := sup
k′∈K¯
b′θ′(k, k
′)− 1
N ′
v(k′), (13)
vm(k) := N
′ sup
k′∈K¯
b′θ′(k
′, k)− v(k′), and (14)
vt(k) := N sup
a∈A¯
cbE(z(a, k)) + v(z(a, k))− u(a), (15)
where we complete definition (15), and later (35), with the convention
∞−∞ :=∞. (16)
The suprema (13)–(14) are attained when u and v are proper (hence lower
semicontinuous), and the same holds true for (15) if, in addition, v is convex
non-decreasing (hence continuous).
Clearly feasibility (6)–(8) implies v ≥ v¯ := max{vw, vm, vt}. When equal-
ity holds — as we shall see that it does (Theorem 13) for some v minimizing
(10) — this implies strong conclusions. For example, vw and vm inherit Lips-
chitz and convexity properties from bL by an envelope argument (Lemma 2),
which v also inherits wherever it coincides with vw or vm. Something similar is
true but more subtle to verify for vt (and hence for v¯) — because of the recur-
sive structure built into the educational pyramid; in (15), as opposed to (13)–
(14), this is manifested in the fact that the k dependence in the argument of
the supremum involves the unknown function v. As another example, when
N ′θ′ and cNθ are large enough, Proposition 7 derives complete specialization
of types into low (workers), medium (managers), and high (teachers). This at
least tells us the role of κ-a.e. agent, leaving the distribution κ = κw+κm+κt
of adults as the only unknown. Here κw = λ
1, κm = λ
2/N ′ and κt = ǫ
2/N
are measures representing the distribution of worker, manager, and teacher
types, and have respective masses κw[K¯] =
(N−1)N ′
N(N ′+1)
, κm[K¯] =
N−1
N(N ′+1)
and
κt[K¯] =
1
N
. If c = 0 but min{N ′θ′, Nθ} ≥ b¯′L/b
′
L, the same proposition yields
more subtle conclusions.
A first insight into the educational pyramid is provided by the following
example.
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Example 1 (Gurus) Fix the number of students each teacher can teach or
the number of workers each manager can manage to be N = N ′ = 10. If
our probability measure κ represents the skill distribution for a population of
110 adults, 90 of them will be workers, managed by 9 managers, and 11 of
them will be teachers. Nine of these 11 = 9+ 1+1 will specialize in teaching
workers, one in teaching teachers, and one in teaching a combination of 9
managers and 1 teacher. We may remember this with the mnemonic 110 =
90+9+(9+1+1). On the other hand, if κ represents the skill distribution for
a population of 11000 = 9000+900+(900+90+(90+9+(9+1+1)) adults,
9000 of them will be workers, managed by 900 managers, while 1100 of them
will be teachers. Of these, 900 will teach workers, 90 will teach managers,
and 110 will teach teachers. Within these 110, there is further specialization
as before: 90 will teach teachers who teach workers, 9 will teach teachers who
teach managers, and 11 will teach teachers who teach teachers. Within this
11, 9 teach worker-teacher-teachers, 1 teaches manager-teacher-teachers, and
1 teaches only teacher-teacher-teachers. These last two may be thought of as
‘gurus’. One of the questions at stake is whether the salaries of these gurus
can grow without bounds as the population size grows.
Next we recall without proof a well-known result which can be proved as
in [7]:
Lemma 2 (Upper envelopes inherit derivative bounds) If f : A×K −→
R is locally Lipschitz in a ∈ A, uniformly in k ∈ K, then g(a) = supk∈K f(a, k)
is locally Lipschitz and for each δ > 0 we have the bounds
inf
k∈K,|a′−a|<δ
fa(a
′, k) ≤ g′(a) ≤ sup
k∈K,|a′−a|<δ
fa(a
′, k)
in the pointwise a.e. senses. Similarly, if f is locally semiconvex in a ∈ A,
uniformly in k ∈ K, then g(a) is locally semiconvex and obeys the bound
g′′(a) ≥ inf
k∈K,|a′−a|<δ
faa(a
′, k)
in the same senses. Here fa :=
∂f
∂a
and faa :=
∂2f
∂a2
.
If f(a′, ·) extends upper semicontinuously to k¯ for some a′ ∈ A, al-
lowing f(a′, k¯) = −∞ as a possible value, there exists k′ ∈ K¯ such that
g(a′) = f(a′, k′); if g(a) is differentiable at a′ ∈]a, a¯[, the envelope theorem
then yields g′(a′) = fa(a
′, k′) provided f(·, k′) is locally semiconvex near a′;
similarly, g′′(a′) ≥ faa(a
′, k′) provided both functions admit a second order
Taylor expansion with respect to a at a′.
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Definition 3 (Supermodular) Given intervals I, J ⊂ R, a function f :
I × J −→ R is weakly supermodular if
f(a, k) + f(a′, k′) ≥ f(a, k′) + f(a′, k) (17)
for all 1 ≤ a < a′ ∈ I and 1 ≤ k < k′ ∈ J . It is strictly supermodular if, on
the same domain, the inequality (17) remains strict.
Remark 4 (Supermodular extensions) It is elementary to check that a
function f which is weakly (or strictly) supermodular on A × K and has
an upper semicontinuous extension to A¯ × K¯ that is continuous and real-
valued except perhaps at (a¯, k¯), is weakly (respectively strictly) supermodular
on A¯× K¯.
Throughout we assume θ, θ′, N,N ′ and a¯ = k¯ are positive parameters with
max{θ, θ′} < 1 ≤ N , and set c ≥ 0 and A = [0, a¯[= K. Unless otherwise
noted, the utilities bE , bL ∈ C
1(K¯) of education and labor have positive lower
bounds b′E/L and b
′′
E/L on their first two derivatives (1)–(3), hence are strictly
convex and increasing.
Lemma 5 (Structure of wage functions) Let v : K −→ R be convex
non-decreasing, with v(k¯) ≥ lim supk→k¯ v(k). Then f(a, k) = v(z(a, k)) will
be weakly supermodular on A¯× K¯, and strictly supermodular unless the con-
vexity of v fails to be strict.
Set z(a, k) = (1−θ)a+ θk, bθ = bE ◦ z and b
′
θ′(k
′, k) = bL((1−θ
′)k′+ θ′k)
where bE/L ∈ C
1(K¯) satisfy (1)–(3). Then the student payoff u defined by
(35) is also convex non-decreasing on K and satisfies u
′
1−θ
≥ cb′E + infk v
′(k)
and u
′′
(1−θ)2
≥ cb′′E + infk v
′′(k) pointwise a.e.
The worker, manager, and teacher wage functions vw/m/t defined by (13)–
(16) and their maximum v¯ := max{vw, vm, vt} are then monotone and convex
on K¯, real-valued on K, and satisfy v¯′ ≥ min{(1 − θ′)b′L, N
′θ′b′L, Nθ(cb
′
E +
infk v
′(k))} and v¯′′ ≥ min{(1−θ′)2b′′L, (θ
′)2N ′b′′L, Nθ
2(cb′′E+infk v
′′(k))} point-
wise a.e.
Proof. First note that convexity and monotonicity imply v is continuous
throughout K = [0, k¯[. Any convex v 6∈ C2 can be approximated by convex
vi ∈ C
2 locally uniformly on ]0, k¯[, with v′i → v
′ pointwise a.e. (and v′′i → v
′′
weakly).
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Now let f(a, k) = cbE(z(a, k)) + v(z(a, k)). For each fixed k˜, we see f
is convex non-decreasing as a function of a ∈ A¯, so the same must be true
of the supremum u(a) = supk∈K¯ f(a, k)− v(k)/N . Supposing for simplicity
that v and bE are C
2(A¯), from
fa(a, k) = (cb
′
E(z(a, k)) + v
′(z(a, k))) za(a, k)
and 0 ≤ z(a, k) = (1− θ)a + θk we compute bounds
cb′E + inf v
′ ≤
fa(a, k)
1− θ
≤ cb′E(z(a, k¯)) + v
′(z(a, k¯))
and
faa(a, k)
(1− θ)2
= cb′′E(z(a, k)) + v
′′(z(a, k))
≥ cb′′E + inf v
′′
which are uniform in k ∈ K¯. The analogous bounds for u follow from
Lemma 2.
So far, we have been working under the assumption that v and bE are
C2(K¯). More generally, v and bE can be approximated uniformly on compact
subsets of K by C2 functions vi and biE satisfying the same hypotheses as
v and bE . As a result, f
i(a, k) := biE(z(a, k)) + v
i(z(a, k)) converges to f
uniformly on compact subsets of A¯2 \{(a¯, k¯)}, and ui(a) := supk∈K¯ f
i(a, k)−
1
N
v(k) converges uniformly to u on compact subsets of A. Thus u inherits
the same Lipschitz and local semiconvexity bounds as ui in the distributional
(and hence pointwise a.e.) sense. See (33) for the distributional definition of
the inequality v′′i ≥ g.
On the other hand, f(a, k; θ) = f(k, a; 1−θ) is symmetrical, and vt(k)/N
is defined by essentially the same formula as u(a), but with the roles of a↔ k
and θ ↔ 1− θ interchanged. Thus vt is also locally Lipschitz and convex on
K, and satisfies v′t ≥ Nθ(cb
′
E + infb v
′(b)) and v′′t ≥ Nθ
2(cb′′E + infb v
′′(b)).
Turning to vw and vm, we apply Lemma 2 but with f(a, k) := b
′
θ′(a, k) =
bL((1 − θ
′)a + θ′k), which is jointly convex and increasing in each variable.
Approximating bL by C
2(K¯) functions if necessary, shows bounds
b′L = b
′
L(0
+) ≤
fa(a, k)
1− θ′
= b′L((1− θ
′)a+ θ′k) ≤ bL((1− θ
′)a− + θ′k¯) ≤ b¯′L
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and
faa(a, k)
(1− θ′)2
= b′′L(z
′(a, k)) ≥ b′′L
are inherited by the convex increasing functions vw and
1
N ′
vm onK. Thus v¯ =
max{vw, vm, vt} is convex, non-decreasing, locally Lipschitz and inherits the
bounds v¯′ ≥ min{(1− θ′)b′L, N
′θ′b′L, Nθ(cb
′
E + infb v
′(b))} and v¯′′ ≥ min{(1−
θ′)2b′′L, N
′(θ′)2b′′L, Nθ
2(cb′′E + infb v
′′(b))} on K.
Finally, setting f(a, k) = v(z(a, k)), using convexity of v ∈ C2(K¯) we
compute
f(a0, k0) + f(a1, k1)− f(a0, k1)− f(a1, k0)
= (1− θ)θ
∫ a1
a0
∫ k1
k0
v′′((1− θ)a + θk)dadk
≥ 0
for a0 < a1 and k0 < k1. For v 6∈ C
2, the same formulas hold by smooth
approximation of v = lim vi. Strict inequality holds unless v′′ = 0 throughout
]z(a0, k0), z(a1, k1)[. This yields the (strict) supermodularity (17) asserted.
We are now in a position to prove our first main result, which describes
how occupations are allocated according to cognitive skill. It depends on
the relative size of various parameters: the teaching capacity N (resp. N ′)
and effectiveness θ (resp. θ′) of teachers (resp. managers) in the population
in question, the range k¯ of cognitive skills, and the relative utility c ≥ 0 of
cognitive achievement compared to wages. When N ′θ′ and cNθ are large
enough it turns out that there is a complete ordering (a)-(b) of skill types
between workers, managers, and teachers in a steady-state economy. However
Nθ ≥ 1 is enough to ensure that no student studies with a teacher whose
cognitive skills are inferior to their own (d), while N ′θ′ and Nθ large enough
guarantee that the most cognitively skilled types all become teachers (c)
(though not that all teachers have high cognitive skills). This conclusion will
help us to establish the phase transition from bounded to unbounded wage
gradients that these teachers enjoy as Nθ passes through 1 (in section 2.6).
The possibility (f) that the number d(k) of types of academic descendants a
teacher can have may grow without bound as k → k¯ foreshadows the analysis
there.
Remark 6 Note that in the following proposition, (c) and (d) together imply
(e), meaning at least one of the two inequalities Nθ ≥ 1 or c ≥ 0 is strict.
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Also note N ′θ′ ≥ b¯′L/b
′
L and Nθ ≥ b¯
′
L/b
′
L are sufficient for (b) and (c),
respectively.
Proposition 7 (Specialization by type; the educational pyramid) Fix
K = [0, k¯[ with k¯ > 0, and c ≥ 0. Suppose u, v : K −→ R are convex, non-
decreasing, and satisfy v = max{vw, vm, vt}.
If (a) Nθcb′E ≥ b¯
′
Lmax{N
′θ′, 1−θ′} then all teacher types lie weakly above
all of the manager and worker types.
If (b) N ′θ′ > (1 − θ′) supk∈K b
′
L(1 − θ
′)k + θ′k¯−)/b′L(θ
′k+) then all of the
worker types lie weakly below all of the manager types.
If (c) Nθ ≥ sup0≤z≤k b
′
L((1 − θ
′)z− + θ′k¯)/(b′L(θ
′z+) + c
N ′θ′
b′E(z
+)) and
(b) holds, and f(a, k) := u(a) + 1
N
v(k) − cbE(z(a, k)) − v(z(a, k)) vanishes
at some (a, k) ∈ K × K where v(z(a, k)) = vm(z(a, k)), then v > vm on
]k, k¯]. In other words, no manager (or worker) can have a type higher than
a teacher of managers.
If (d) Nθ ≥ 1, then any student of type a ∈ K will be weakly less skilled
than his teacher, and strictly less skilled if (e) either c > 0 or Nθ > 1 in
addition.
If (f) either c > 0 or v′(0+) > 0, then (d)–(e) imply all academic descen-
dants of a teacher with skill k ∈ K will display one of at most finitely many
d = d(k) distinct skill types, unless differentiability of v fails at k. However,
d(k) may diverge as k → k¯, in which case v′(k) → +∞ at a rate related to
d(k) by (22).
Proof. Lemma 5 asserts convexity of vw/m/t, hence one-sided differentia-
bility everywhere, and two sided-differentiability except perhaps at countably
many points. At points k ∈]0, k¯[ of differentiability, Lemma 2 (the envelope
theorem) allow us to estimate the wage gradients
v′w(k) = (1− θ
′)b′L(z
′(k, k′m)) ∈ (1− θ
′)]b′L, b¯
′
L[ (18)
v′m(k) = N
′θ′b′L(z
′(k′w, k)) ∈ N
′θ′]b′L, b¯
′
L[, (19)
v′t (k) = Nθ(cb
′
E(z(a, k)) + v
′(z(a, k))) ≥ Nθcb′E(θk) (20)
where k′m, k
′
w and a are the respective points at which the suprema (13)–(15)
(or their extension to K¯) are attained. Such points exist in K¯ according to
the same lemma; we can extend v
(
k¯
)
= v
(
k¯−
)
:= limk↑k¯ v(k) and u
(
k¯
)
∈
R ∪ {+∞} similarly without changing vw/m/t. Consideration of the worst-
case scenario k′w = 0 and k
′
m = k¯ in (18)–(19) shows if (b) holds that v
′
m(k) <
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v′w(k) at each point k where both derivatives are defined. Then the locally
Lipschitz function vm − vw is strictly increasing. Since this function is non-
positive on {k | v¯ = vw} and non-negative on {k
′ | v¯ = vm}, the first set
must lie entirely to the left of the second, as desired.
Estimating the wage gradient for a teacher of type k0 = k ∈ K is more
subtle, due to the recursive nature of formula (20). Since the student of
ability a1 = a taught by k0 winds up with cognitive skill k1 = (1−θ)a1+θk0 =
z(a1, k0), we find
v′t(ki) = Nθ(cb
′
E(ki+1) + v
′(ki+1)) (21)
for i = 0, assuming differentiability of vt at k0. Differentiability of v and
bE at k1 (and also of vt ≤ v) follows from convexity, since replacing k by k0
produces equality in u(a1) +
1
N
vt(k) − v(z(a1, k)) − cbE(z(k, a1)) ≥ 0: the
first-order condition
(v′ + cb′E)(z(a1, k0)
−) ≥ 1
N
v′t(k0)/zk(a1, k0) ≥ (v
′ + cb′E)(z(a1, k0)
+)
forces the one-sided derivatives (v′+cb′E)(k
−
1 ) ≤ (v
′+cb′E)(k
+
1 ) to agree. From
(21) we have v′t(k0) ≥ Nθcb
′
E , which dominates (1− θ
′)b¯′L and N
′θ′b¯′L in case
(a). Since vw/m/t are locally Lipschitz, monotonicity of v
′(k) then combines
with the estimates (18)–(19) already established to show all teacher types k0
are at least as high as the highest worker and manager types.
From (d)Nθ ≥ 1 and (21) we conclude v′(k1) ≤ v
′
t(k0), and this inequality
is strict if (e) also holds, in which case every student studies with a teacher
more skilled than himself, or — what is equivalent in our model — no student
(except the very top type a = a¯) becomes as skilled as his teacher.
Next, assume as in case (c), that a teacher of type k ∈ K teaches a
student of type a who becomes a manager of type z = z(a, k). Since v ≥ vm
with equality at z, we have v′(z+) ≥ v′m(z
+). Analogously to (19)–(20) we
find
1
Nθ
v′t(k
+) ≥ cb′E(z
+) + v′m(z
+)
≥ cb′E(z
+) +N ′θ′b′L((1− θ
′)kw + θ
′z+),
≥ cb′E(z
+) +N ′θ′b′L(θ
′z+)
with equality holding in the first two estimates if all the derivatives in ques-
tion exist. On the other hand,
v′m(k¯) ≤ N
′θ′b′L((1− θ
′)z− + θ′k¯)
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since (b) implies the worker types all lie below the manager type z. Hypothe-
sis (c) now yields v′t(k
+) ≥ v′m(k¯), and the convexity of vt and strict convexity
of vm shown as in Lemma 5 then imply v
′
t > v
′
m on ]k, k¯[. Vanishing of the
non-negative function f at (a, k) implies vt(k) = v(k) ≥ vm(k), whence the
desired conclusion vt > vm follows on ]k, k¯] by integration.
Case (f) is more delicate, and our conclusions for it are more involved. If
the student a1 above elects to become a worker or manager, we can estimate
(21) using (18)–(19). However, if the student becomes a teacher whose stu-
dents’ innate ability a2 allows them to acquire human capital k2 = z(a2, k1),
we must iterate (21). And if these students in turn become teachers teaching
students of ability a3 to acquire human capital k3 = z(a3, k2), we must iter-
ate again, and continue iterating until the student of ability ad who acquires
human capital kd = z(ad, kd−1) elects to become a worker or manager instead
of another teacher. Assuming (d)–(f), we claim this occurs for some finite
d: otherwise the skills ki+1 < ki converge to some k∞ ∈ K, for which the
limit of (21) yields an identity ( 1
Nθ
− 1)v′(k+∞) = cb
′
E(k
+
∞) equating quan-
tities with different signs. Recalling v′(k+∞) ≥ 0 and c ≥ 0, hypothesis (f)
asserts at least one of these inequalities is strict, while (d) asserts Nθ ≥ 1.
Unless Nθ = 1 and c = 0, this contradicts the limiting identity. But Nθ = 1
and c = 0 contradicts (e). Thus the sequence ki terminates at some finite d
(which depends on k0).
At this point we have
v′t(k) = Nθ
(
cb′E(k1) +Nθ
(
cb′E(k2) +Nθ
(
... +Nθ (cb′E(kd) + v
′(kd))
)))
≥


1− (Nθ)d
1−Nθ
Nθcb′E(θ
dk) + (Nθ)dv′(θdk) if Nθ 6= 1
dcb′E(θ
dk) + v′(θdk) if Nθ = 1,
(22)
where we have summed the geometric series and estimated kd ≥ θ
dk0.
2.3 Characterization of optimality
When we turn to the question of existence of optimal payoffs (u, v) for the
linear program (10), our strategy will be to perform the minimization under
the additional assumption that u and v are convex non-decreasing, and then
to show these additional constraints are non-binding at the optimum, thus
have no effect on the outcome. Convexity and monotonicity provide the
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requisite compactness for extracting limits from minimizing sequences. In
order to show these constraints are non-binding however, it is necessary to
control the payoff u(a) on the full interval A = [0, a¯[, and not only on sptα.
Similarly it is necessary to control v on the full interval K = A, and not
only on the support of the unknown distribution κ of adult skills. Since the
original problem is largely insensitive to the values of u and v outside sptα
and spt κ, we introduce a perturbed version of the problem to provide this
control: for each δ > 0 set
LP (δ)∗ := inf
(u,v)∈Fδ
δ〈u+ v〉A +
∫
[0,a¯]
u(a)α(da) (23)
where 〈v〉A :=
1
H1(A)
∫
A
vdH1 denotes the Lebesgue average of v over A. Here
Fδ = F0 denotes the same feasible set as before, with a subscript denoting
only the possible dependence of the constant c = cδ in (6) on δ > 0. Also u
(and hence v) ∈ L1(A¯, α), and if δ > 0 then u, v ∈ L1(A,H1). We must first
solve the perturbed problem (23) and then extract the δ → 0 limit. For the
latter endeavor and to characterize the optimizers, it will be crucial to know
LP (δ)∗ is in fact dual to
LP (δ)∗ := max
ǫ,λ≥0 on A¯×K¯ satisfying (25)−(26)
cδǫ(bE ◦ z) + λ(bL ◦ z
′) (24)
where
ǫ1 = α +
δ
|A|
H1|A (25)
and
λ1 +
1
N ′
λ2 +
1
N
ǫ2 = z#ǫ+
δ
|K|
H1|K . (26)
Let us begin by verifying LP (δ)∗ ≤ LP (δ)∗. This would be standard if the
primal infimum were restricted to continuous bounded functions u, v ∈ C(A¯),
as in Appendix A where the reverse inequality and attainment of the dual
maximum are verified. However, a priori we know only that u, v differ from
continuous bounded functions by non-decreasing functions, and even a pos-
teriori we do not know whether or not minimizers of (10) or (23) are bounded
at k¯. We have only the conditional result of Theorem 16 to suggest that they
are. Thus we are forced to work in a space which includes unbounded func-
tions, and to check their inclusion does not spoil the otherwise elementary
duality inequality LP (δ)∗ ≤ LP (δ)∗.
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Proposition 8 (Easy direction of duality for unbounded functions)
Fix δ, cδ non-negative and θ, θ
′, N,N ′, a¯ = k¯ positive with max{θ, θ′} < 1 ≤
N . Let α be a Borel probability measure on A¯, where A = [0, a¯[= K, and
define z(a, k) = (1− θ)a+ θk, bθ = bE ◦ z and b
′
θ′(a, k) = bL((1− θ
′)a+ θ′k)
where bE/L ∈ C
0(K¯). If Borel measures (ǫ, λ) and Borel functions (u, v) ∈ Fδ
are feasible for the primal and dual problems (23)–(24), with u ∈ L1(A¯, α)
and uδ, vδ ∈ L1(A,H1), then α(u)+ δ〈u+ v〉A ≥ cδǫ(bθ)+λ(b
′
θ′) provided v ∈
L1(A¯, z#ǫ). If α satisfies the doubling condition (12), then v ∈ L
1(A¯, z#ǫ).
Proof. Taking feasible pairs (ǫ, λ) of measures and (u, v) ∈ Fδ of func-
tions with u ∈ L1(A¯, α) and uδ, vδ ∈ L1(A,H1), the stability constraint for
the education sector implies
u(a)− cδbE(z(a, k)) ≥ v(z(a, k))−
1
N
v(k), (27)
on A¯× K¯, and the left hand side is in L1(A¯2, ǫ). Thus
+∞ > α(u)− cδǫ(bθ) + δ〈u+ v〉A
≥ 〈δv〉K +
∫
A¯×K¯
[v(z(a, k))− 1
N
v(k)]ǫ(da, dk) (28)
since ǫ1 = α + δ
|A|
H1|A. On the other hand, the steady state constraint
z#ǫ +
δ
|K|
H1|K = λ
1 + 1
N ′
λ2 + 1
N
ǫ2 combines with the stability constraint
v(a) + 1
N ′
v(k) ≥ b′θ′(a, k) for the labor sector to imply
〈δv〉K +
∫
K¯
vd(z#ǫ−
1
N
ǫ2) =
∫
K¯
vd(λ1 + 1
N ′
λ2) (29)
≥
∫
A¯×K¯
b′θ′dλ (30)
> 0.
Now if v ∈ L1(A¯, z#ǫ) we can equate the right hand side of (28) with the left
hand side of (29) to obtain the first stated conclusion.
We must still show that the doubling (12) of α at a¯ implies 0 ≤ v ∈
L1(A¯, z#ǫ). Recall that (u, v) = (u0 + u1, v0 + v1) with u0, v0 ∈ C(A¯) and
u1, v1 : A¯ −→ [0,∞] non-decreasing (in fact strictly increasing without loss of
generality). Since v0 is bounded there is no question about its integrability.
We shall use v ≤ u from (8) and u ∈ L1(A¯, α) to deduce v1 ∈ L
1(A¯, κ) for
κ := z#ǫ. Since v1 is strictly increasing, v
−1
1 (y) ∈ R ∪ {±∞} can be defined
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unambiguously. Lemma 14, the doubling condition (12), and the layer-cake
representation [11] of the Lebesgue integral imply∫
K¯
v1(k)κ(dk) =
∫ ∞
0
κ[v−11 [y,∞]]dy
=
∫ ∞
0
κ[a¯− (a¯− v−11 (y)), a¯]dy
≤
∫ ∞
0
α[k¯ −
1
1− θ
(a¯− v−11 (y)), a¯]dy
≤ C
1
θ
−1
∫ ∞
0
α[v−11 (y), a¯]dy (31)
for some C <∞. On the other hand, v1 ≤ u0 + u1 − v0 ≤ u1 + const yields
u−11 (y − const) ≤ v
−1
1 (y), so∫ ∞
0
α[u−11 (y), a¯]dy =
∫
u1(a)α(da) < +∞
implies finiteness of (31) and completes the proof that v1 ∈ L
1(K¯, κ).
Corollary 9 (Characterizations of optimality) Fix δ, cδ, θ, θ
′, N,N ′, z, bθ, b
′
θ′
and k¯ = a¯ as in Proposition 8, and a Borel probability measure α on A¯ sat-
isfying (12), where A = [0, a¯[= K and a¯ ∈ sptα. A pair of feasible mea-
sures ǫ, λ ≥ 0 on A¯2 maximizes the dual problem (24) if there exist feasible
(u, v) ∈ Fδ such that α(u) + δ〈u+ v〉A = cδǫ(bθ) + λ(b
′
θ′).
Conversely, (u, v) ∈ Fδ minimize the primal problem if and only if there
exist ǫ, λ ≥ 0 feasible for the dual problem such that α(u) + δ〈u + v〉A =
cδǫ(bθ) + λ(b
′
θ′).
For feasible pairs in the given spaces, α(u) + 〈u + v〉A = cδǫ(bθ) + λ(b
′
θ′)
is equivalent to the assertions ǫ(f) = 0 = λ(g) where f(a, k) = u(a) + v(k)
N
−
cδbθ(a, k)−v(z(a, k)) ≥ 0 and g(k
′, k) = v(k′)+ v(k)
N
−b′θ′(k
′, k) ≥ 0 on A¯×K¯.
Proof. Let (ǫ, λ) be a pair of feasible measures for the dual problem,
and (u, v) ∈ Fδ so that u ∈ L
1(A¯, α) and uδ, vδ ∈ L1(A,H1) and f, g ≥ 0
when defined as above. Then Proposition 8 asserts v ∈ L1(A¯, z#ǫ) and
cδǫ(bθ) + λ(b
′
θ′) ≤ LP (δ)
∗ ≤ LP (δ)∗ ≤ α(u) + δ〈u+ v〉A. If cδǫ(bθ) + λ(b
′
θ′) =
α(u) + δ〈u + v〉A this forces this chain of inequalities to become equalities,
showing (ǫ, λ) and (u, v) to optimize their respective problems.
The converse is proved using the result LP (δ)∗ = LP (δ)∗, which follows
by combining the same proposition with Theorem 18. Suppose α(u) + δ〈u+
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v〉A = LP (δ)∗, meaning (u, v) is optimal. Lemma 17 provides (ǫ, λ) such that
cδǫ(bθ) + λ(b
′
θ′) = LP (δ)
∗.
Finally, we claim that cδǫ(bθ) + λ(b
′
θ′) = α(u) + δ〈u+ v〉A is equivalent to
ǫ(f) = 0 = λ(g). This follows from the chain of inequalities which establish
cǫ(bθ) + λ(b
′
θ′) ≥ α(u) in Proposition 8: ǫ(f) = 0 is equivalent to equality in
(28), λ(g) = 0 is equivalent to equality in (30), and when both of these hold
then cδǫ(bθ) + λ(b
′
θ′) = α(u) + δ〈u+ v〉A.
Remark 10 (Converse) According to Theorems 13 and 18, the sufficient
condition for optimality of (ǫ, λ) given by Corollary 9 is also necessary.
2.4 Optimal wages for the primal problem
Using the foundations laid in the previous sections, we are ready to demon-
strate the existence of optimal wages v(k) and payoffs u(a) for the primal
problem (10). This is done using a compactness and (lower semi-)continuity
argument for the perturbed problem (23), and then taking the limit δ → 0.
For δ > 0, we assume v is convex nondecreasing, and then use Lemma 5
and the characterization v = max{vw, vw, vt} — which identifies the wage of
an ability k adult with the maximum he can earn as a worker, manager or
teacher — to show the convexity and monotonicity assumptions on v do not
bind, so play no role in the outcome of our (infinite-dimensional) linear pro-
gram. Thus convexity of the wages in our model emerges for reasons which
manifest rather differently than in Rosen’s investigation of superstars [17].
Compactness for convex non-decreasing v is asserted in the following
lemma. Some delicacy is required to show that if v or u diverges to +∞,
then both do so on the same half-open interval, and at a uniform rate.
Lemma 11 (Compactness for wage functions) Fix K = [0, k¯[ and g ∈
L1loc(K). A sequence vi : K −→ [0,∞[ of convex non-decreasing functions
satisfying v′′i (k) ≥ g(k) a.e., admits a subsequence which converges pointwise
to a limit v0 : K −→ [0,∞] which is real valued on [0, k0[, and infinite on
]k0, k¯[, for some k0 ∈ [0, k¯]. The convergence is uniform on compact subsets
of [0, k0[, and the analogous bound v
′′
0(k) ≥ g(k) holds a.e. on its interior.
Furthermore, for a > k0
ui(a) := max
k∈[0,k¯[
cbE(z(a, k)) + vi(z(a, k))−
1
N
vi(k)
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diverges to u0(a) = +∞ as i → ∞ along the subsequence described above,
where bE ∈ C
1(K¯) satisfies (1)-(3), c ≥ 0 and z(a, k) = (1− θ)a + θk.
Proof. The fundamental theorem of calculus yields
vi(k
′) = vi(0) +
∫ k′
0
v′i(k)dk. (32)
Since 0 ≤ v′i(k) is non-decreasing for each i, Helly’s selection theorem pro-
vides a subsequence converging to a non-decreasing limit v′0(k) on K, ex-
cept possibly at discontinuities of v′0 in ]0, k¯[. Choose a further subsequence
for which v0(0) := limj→∞ vi(j)(0) converges; unless such a sequence exists,
v0(0) = +∞ and the lemma follows immediately with k0 = 0. Therefore
assume v0(0) < ∞ and choose k0 ∈ [0, k¯] so that v
′
0(k) < ∞ for k < k0 and
v′0(k) =∞ for k > k0. For k
′ < k0, Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theo-
rem allows us to take i(j) → ∞ in (32), to obtain a continuous limit v0(k
′)
on [0, k0[. It follows that vi(j) → v0 uniformly on compact subsets of [0, k0[.
Monotonicity of v′i ensures vi(j)(k)→∞ for each k > k0. For vi, g ∈ L
1
loc, the
inequality v′′i ≥ g holds in the distributional sense — meaning∫ k¯
0
[f ′′(k)vi(k)− f(k)g(k)]dk ≥ 0 (33)
for each smooth compactly supported test function 0 ≤ f ∈ C∞c (]0, k¯[) —
if and only if it holds in the a.e. sense. Thus v′′i ≥ g distributionally, and
the bound v′′0 ≥ g follows on ]0, k0[, using Lebesgue’s dominated convergence
theorem again. Taking g = 0 shows v0 is convex on ]0, k0[, for example.
Now if a > k0, taking k = k0 implies k0 < z(a, k) = (1 − θ)a + θk, thus
ui(j)(a) ≥ cvi(j)(z(a, k0)) diverges to +∞ as j →∞.
Corollary 12 (Convergence uniform from below) Suppose a sequence
vi : [0, k¯[−→ [0,∞[ of functions satisfying the hypotheses of Lemma 11 con-
verges pointwise to v0 : [0, k¯[−→ [0,∞] which is real valued on [0, k0[, and
infinite on ]k0, k¯[ for some k0 ∈ [0, k¯]. If v0(k
−
0 ) := limk↑k0 v0(k) < +∞ then
0 ≤ lim inf
i→∞
inf
k∈[0,k0[
vi(k)− v0(k). (34)
On the other hand, if v0(k
−
0 ) = +∞ then the sequence grows uniformly in
the sense that for each c < ∞ taking i′ < ∞ large enough implies vi(k) ≥ c
for all k > k0 − 1/i
′ and i > i′.
27
Proof. Given δ > 0, taking k1 < k0 sufficiently large makes v0(k1) >
v0(k
−
0 ) − δ/2. Taking i sufficiently large then ensures vi(k1) > v0(k
−
0 ) − δ,
whence for all k ∈ [k1, k0[ monotonicity yields vi(k) > v0(k) − δ. Since the
convergence vi → v0 is uniform on [0, k1], this concludes the corollary in case
v0(k
−
0 ) < +∞ is finite.
If v0(k
−
0 ) = +∞, given c <∞ take i
′ sufficiently large that v0(k0−1/i
′) >
c and then larger still to ensure vi(k0 − 1/i
′) > c for all i > i′. Monotonicity
again concludes the proof.
Theorem 13 (Existence of minimizing wages) Fix c ≥ 0 and positive
θ, θ′, N,N ′ and a¯ = k¯ with max{θ, θ′} < 1 ≤ N . Set A = [0, a¯[= K and let
α be a Borel probability measure on A¯ satisfying the doubling condition (12)
at a¯ ∈ sptα. Define z(a, k) = (1 − θ)a + θk, bθ = bE ◦ z and b
′
θ′(a, k) =
bL((1− θ
′)a+ θ′k), where bE/L ∈ C
1(K¯) satisfy (1)–(3). Then infimum (10)
is attained by functions (u, v) satisfying v = max{vw, vm, vt} on K¯ = [0, k¯]
and
u(a) = sup
k∈K¯
cbE(z(a, k)) + v(z(a, k))−
1
N
v(k) (35)
on A¯, where the vw/m/t are defined by (13)–(16); here u, v : A¯ −→]0,∞]
are continuous, convex, non-decreasing, and — except perhaps at a¯ — real-
valued. For j ∈ {1, 2}, if Nθj ≥ 1 then djv/dkj ≥ b
(j)
L min{(1−θ
′)j , (θ′)jN ′}.
Proof. Fix 0 < δ < 1 and cδ := c > 0 positive; if we prefer c = 0 set
cδ = δ in the δ → 0 limit procedure which follows. We are going to study the
perturbed primal problem (23) under the same feasibility constraints (6)–(8)
as (10) — which include u ∈ L1(A¯, α) — plus the artificial constraint that
v be convex nondecreasing. From (8), both u and v ∈ L1(A¯, α) and have
positive lower bounds. For δ > 0 we assume u, v ∈ L1(A,H1) without loss
of generality, since otherwise the term 〈u + v〉A = +∞ makes the objective
diverge. Feasibility of the pair (u, v) = (1 + cδ b¯E/b¯L, 1)b¯L yields an upper
bound (1+2δ)(cδ b¯E+b¯L) for the infimum (23). As remarked after (8), we may
always replace u and v by their lower semi-continuous hulls without violating
feasibility. Since α ≥ 0, this only improves the objective (23); for the same
reason, it costs no generality to henceforth suppose u to be related to v by
(35). Lemma 5 then implies both v and u are convex and non-decreasing,
hence continuous as extended real-valued functions.
Lemma 11 allows us to extract a subsequential limit (uδ, vδ) satisfying
the same constraints from any sequence of approximate minimizers for (23).
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Fatou’s lemma ensures the limit (uδ, vδ) minimizes the objective subject to
these constraints. Replacing the monotone convex functions uδ and vδ again
by their lower-semicontinuous hulls ensures both are continuous. Since a¯ ∈
sptα, our a priori bound (1 + 2δ)(cδb¯E + b¯L) on the objective implies the
non-decreasing functions uδ(a) and vδ(k) are finite, except possibly at a¯ and
k¯, and ∫
A¯
uδ(a)α(da) ≤ (1 + 2δ)(cδ b¯E + b¯L). (36)
Notice equality must hold in
uδ(a) ≥ sup
k∈[0,k¯]
cδbE(z(a, k)) + vδ(z(a, k))−
1
N
vδ(k) (37)
since otherwise replacing uδ by the right-hand side of (37) yields a feasi-
ble pair which lowers the objective functional, contradicting the asserted
optimality. Use (u, v) = (uδ, vδ) to define (v
w
δ , v
m
δ , v
t
δ) := (vw, vm, vt) and
v¯δ := max{vw, vm, vt}.
Feasibility implies vδ ≥ v¯δ, and Lemma 5 implies v¯δ is continuous on K,
convex increasing on K¯, and satisfies
v¯′δ ≥ min{(1− θ
′)b′L, N
′θ′b′L, (cδb
′
E + inf v
′
δ(k))Nθ} and (38)
v¯′′δ ≥ min{(1− θ
′)2b′′L, (θ
′)2N ′b′′L, (cδb
′′
E + inf v
′′
δ )Nθ
2} (39)
on ]0, k¯[. If η := vδ − v¯δ is positive somewhere, it is positive on an interval
where the only binding constraints can be v′δ = 0 or v
′′
δ = 0. For small λ > 0,
the perturbation vλ := (1−λ)vδ +λv¯δ respects these differential constraints.
We will now show the pair (uδ, v
λ) respects the other constraints as well;
unless the continuous function η = 0 throughout K, this pair lowers the
objective functional, a contradiction forcing vδ = v¯δ.
Since vλ = vδ − λη = v¯δ + (1− λ)η, for k
′, k ∈ K¯ we find
vλ(k′) + v
λ(k)
N ′
− b′θ′(k
′, k) = v¯δ(k
′) + vδ(k)
N ′
− b′θ′(k
′, k) + (1− λ)η(k′)− λ
N
η(k)
≥ η(k′)[1− λ(1 + 1
N
η(k)
η(k′)
)], (40)
and also
vλ(k′) + v
λ(k)
N ′
− b′θ′(k
′, k) = vδ(k
′) + v¯δ(k)
N ′
− b′θ′(k
′, k)− λη(k′) + 1−λ
N
η(k)
≥ η(k)
N
[1− λ(1 + Nη(k
′)
η(k)
)]. (41)
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If both η(k′) ≥ 0 and η(k) ≥ 0 are non-zero, then taking λ < 1/2 ensures
either (40) or (41) is positive. The same conclusion remains true if one of
η(k′) or η(k) vanishes. If both vanish, there is nothing to prove.
On the other hand, adding uδ(a)− cδbE(z(a, k)) to
vλ(k)
N
− vλ(z(a, k)) = v¯δ(k)
N
− vδ(z(a, k)) +
1−λ
N
η(k) + λη(z(a, k))
shows
uδ(a) +
vλ(k)
N
− cδbE(z(a, k))− v
λ(z(a, k)) ≥ 1−λ
N
η(k) + λη(z(a, k)) ≥ 0
as desired, since v¯δ ≥ v
t
δ. This establishes vδ = v¯δ on K. At k¯, convexity
implies upper semicontinuity of v¯δ and it is dominated by the continuous
function vδ, so identity vδ = v¯δ extends to K¯.
As a consequence of (38)–(39), for cδ > 0 both v
′
δ and v
′′
δ are bounded
away from zero so the constraints min{v′, v′′} ≥ 0 are not binding. We claim
(uδ, vδ) must also minimize the linear program (23) even among feasible pairs
which do not satisfy these additional constraints. To see this, we’ll suppose
the objective was lower at some other feasible pair (u, v) ∈ F0 and derive a
contradiction. If u, v ∈ C2(A¯), then the pair (1 − s)(uδ, vδ) + s(u, v) ∈ F0
also lowers the objective for s > 0 sufficiently small, and inherits the strict
convexity and monotonicity of (uδ, vδ) to produce the desired contradiction.
If u, v 6∈ C2(A¯), the same contradiction will be obtained after approximat-
ing (u, v) by a smooth feasible pair. We can at least assume u and v are
continuous and bounded according to the proof of Theorem 18. The Stone-
Weierstrauss theorem then shows u and v can be approximated uniformly by
smooth functions (u˜σ, v˜σ) such that u+σ ≤ u˜σ ≤ u+2σ and v ≤ v˜σ ≤ v+σ
as σ → 0+. In this case, (u˜σ, v˜σ) ∈ F0 follows from (u, v) ∈ F0. Convergence
of the objective function to its limiting value as σ → 0 is readily verified.
This establishes the desired contradiction, hence the minimality of (uδ, vδ) in
F0.
Now Corollary 9 asserts there are non-negative measures ǫδ ≥ 0 and
λδ ≥ 0 satisfying the perturbed feasibility constraints (24) such that
α(uδ) + δ〈uδ + vδ〉A = cδǫδ(bθ) + λδ(b
′
θ′). (42)
Lemma 11 yields a subsequential limit (uδi, vδi)→ (u0, v0) pointwise on A¯×K¯
and uniformly on compact subsets of [0, a0[×[0, k0[, with u0(a) = +∞ for a >
a0 ∈ [0, a¯] and v0(k) = +∞ for k > k0 ∈ [0, k¯] and a0 ≤ k0. We claim a0 = a¯.
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Recalling the monotonicity of uδ, if a0 < a¯ we have uδi(k)→ +∞ uniformly
on a ∈ [(a0 + a¯)/2, a¯]. Since a¯ ∈ sptα, Fatou’s lemma will contradict the
bound (36) unless a0 = a¯. This also forces equality in k¯ = a¯ ≤ k0 ≤ k¯. Thus
(u0, v0) are feasible for the original problem (10).
Extracting a further subsequence if necessary, we may also assume (ǫδi , λδi)→
(ǫ0, λ0) weak-∗ in C(A¯×K¯)
∗ as δi → 0 to feasible measures for the dual prob-
lem (11). (This compactness argument and topology are also described in
the proof of Lemma 17.) Taking the δ → 0 limit of (42), Fatou’s lemma
combines with the weak-∗ convergence to give
α(u0) ≤ c0ǫ0(bθ) + λ0(b
′
θ′) ∈ R.
Proposition 8 yields the opposite inequality, and its corollary then confirms
the desired optimality of (u0, v0) (and of (ǫ0, λ0)).
Noting vδ = v¯δ, the inequalities (38)–(39) survive passage to the δi → 0
limit in both the distributional (33) and a.e. senses. For j = 1 or j = 2, when
Nθj ≥ 1, these inequalities imply djvδ/dk
j ≥ b
(j)
L min{(1 − θ
′)j, (θ′)jN ′}
throughout K before and hence after the limit. It remains to show the
identity vδ = v¯δ survives the δi → 0 limit first on K, and eventually on K¯.
Although we have only subsequential convergence of (uδ, vδ), we abuse
notation by writing δ → 0 to denote this subsequence hereafter. Taking
δ → 0 in the remaining identity of interest vδ = v¯δ yields
v0 := lim
δ→0
vδ = max{lim sup
δ→0
vwδ , lim sup
δ→0
vmδ , lim sup
δ→0
vtδ}. (43)
Using k¯− to denote the limit k ↑ k¯, we claim u0(k¯
−) <∞ if v0(k¯
−) <∞, and
u0(k¯
−) = ∞ if v0(k¯
−) = ∞. The second claim follows from (8), which gives
u0(a) ≥
N−1
N
v0(a); the first claim is more subtle unless α has a Dirac mass
at a¯, but follows from the boundedness of v0 in the supremum (35) due to
the following parenthetical paragraph.
(To see that (35) continues to hold when δ = 0 assuming α[{a¯}] = 0,
consider the continuous function fδ(a, k) := uδ(a)+
1
N
vδ(k)− cδbE(z(a, k))−
vδ(z(a, k)) ≥ 0 on A× K¯. The zero set Zδ of fδ is relatively closed in A∩ K¯;
it is non-decreasing by the strict submodularity shown in Lemma 5, and
contains (A × K¯) ∩ spt ǫδ according to Corollary 9. For each (aδ, kδ) ∈ Zδ
this monotonicity implies∫
]aδ ,a¯]×K¯
ǫδ(da, dk) ≤
∫
A¯×[kδ,k¯]
ǫδ(da, dk). (44)
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Fixing aδ = a, to establish the limiting case of (35) it is enough to show
lim supδ→0 kδ < k¯. Recalling that the left and right marginals of ǫδ are given
by (24), setting ∆a = a¯− a and ∆kδ = k¯ − kδ, from (44) we deduce
1
N
(a¯α(]a¯−∆a, a¯]) + δ∆a) ≤ a¯(z#ǫδ)([k¯ −∆kδ, k¯]) + δ∆kδ
≤ δ∆kδ + (a¯α + δH
1|A)([a¯−
1
1− θ
∆kδ, a¯])
where the second inequality follows from (46). Since a¯ ∈ sptα but α[{a¯}] = 0,
the left hand side remains bounded away from zero in the limit δ → 0, whence
we conclude lim infδ→0∆kδ > 0 also. Thus (35) holds for a ∈ A with δ = 0.)
Now if v0(k¯
−) <∞ then Corollary 12 allows us to deduce lim sup
δ→0
vtδ ≤ v
t
0
for k ∈ [0, k¯[ from
vtδ(k) = N sup
a∈[0,a¯[
cδbE(z(a, k)) + vδ(z(a, k))− uδ(a), (45)
noting u0(a) ≤ lim infδ→0 uδ(a) uniformly on [0, a¯[ and z(a, k) is constrained
to the range where the convergence vδ → v0 is uniform. Showing lim sup
δ→0
vwδ ≤
vw0 and lim sup
δ→0
vmδ ≤ v
m
0 is similar but simpler, whence v0 ≤ max{v
w
0 , v
m
0 , v
t
0}.
The opposite inequality follows from the constraints satisfied by (u0, v0).
If v0(k¯
−) = +∞ on the other hand, then for fixed k ∈ [0, k¯[ let Cδ
denote the supremum of cδbE(z(a, k))+vδ(z(a, k)) over a ∈ [0, a¯[ and observe
Cδ → C0 < ∞ as δ → 0. Take δ0 > 0 sufficiently small that Cδ0 < 2C0,
and smaller if necessary using Corollary 12 so that uδ(a¯ − δ0) > 2C0 for
all δ < δ0. For δ < δ0, the supremum (45) is unchanged if we restrict its
domain a ∈ [0, a¯− δ0] to an interval where convergence (uδ, vδ)→ (u0, v0) is
uniform. Thus taking δ → 0 in (45) yields lim
δ→0
vtδ(k) = v
t
0(k). A similar but
simpler argument yields vw0 (k) = lim
δ→0
vwδ (k) and v
m
0 (k) = lim
δ→0
vmδ (k), whence
the desired identity follows from (43).
It costs no generality to replace u0 by the right hand side of (37) with
δ = 0, which is feasible and no larger than u0 in any case. (In fact, they
coincide throughout A by the parenthetical paragraph above.) Let us now
argue that we may take v0 to be continuous, or equivalently take equality to
hold in v0(k¯
−) ≤ v0(k¯). If v0(k¯
−) < v0(k¯), replacing v0(k¯) with v0(k¯
−) does
not violate any of the feasibility constraints. Nor does it affect the values of
vw, vm, vt or u0 — except to remedy any discontinuity in vt or u0 by reducing
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vt(k¯) and u0(a¯). This can only improve the objective, and by continuity of
all of the resulting functions extends the identity v0 = v¯0 from K — where
it was already established — to K¯, to complete the proof.
2.5 Uniqueness and properties of optimal matchings
Finally, we are ready to tackle the structure of optimal matchings in the
education and labor sectors, and to give conditions guaranteeing uniqueness
of optimizers for both the primal and dual problems (10)–(11).
The structure our education sector often leads to positive assortative
matching ǫ of students with teachers. (Our labor sector always leads to
positive assortative matching of workers to managers.) However, since dis-
tribution κ of cognitive skills acquired by adults in our population is endoge-
nous, it might not be unique. The following theorem specifies conditions for
uniqueness. These require, in particular, that κ as well as the exogenous
distribution of student skills α be atom free. The following lemma details
how κ inherits this and other useful properties from the distribution α of
student skills input. Even without positive assortativity, unless the (exoge-
nous) probability measure α concentrates positive mass at the top skill type
α[{a¯}] > 0, it follows that κ concentrates no mass at the upper endpoint
of K = [0, k¯[. Then any matching ǫ ≥ 0 on A¯ × K¯ which satisfies the
steady-state constraint 1
N
ǫ1 ≤ z#ǫ must concentrate all of its mass on A×K.
Lemma 14 (Endogenous distribution of adult skills) Fix θ ∈]0, 1[ and
a Borel measure α ≥ 0 on A¯ with α[A¯] < ∞ for A = [0, a¯[ with a¯ > 0. Set
K = [0, k¯[= A and z(a, k) = (1 − θ)a + θk. If ǫ ≥ 0 on A¯ × K¯ has α = ǫ1
as its left marginal, then for each k¯−∆k ∈ K the corresponding distribution
κ = z#ǫ of adult skills satisfies∫
[k¯−∆k,k¯]
κ(dk) ≤
∫
[a¯− 1
1−θ
∆k,a¯]
α(da). (46)
Thus κ has no atom at k¯ unless α has an atom at a¯.
In addition, if ǫ is positive assortative and α has no atoms, then κ has
no atoms and ǫ = (id × kt)#α for some non-decreasing map kt : A¯ −→ K¯.
uniquely determined α-a.e. by κ. Moreover, if α(da) = αac(a)da is given by
a density αac ∈ L1(A), then κ(dk) = κac(k)dk is given by a related density
κac ∈ L1(K) satisfying
αac(a) = (1 + θ(k′t(a)− 1))κ
ac(z(a, kt(a))) (47)
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for Lebesgue-a.e. a ∈ A. In this case ‖κac‖L∞(K) ≤
1
1−θ
‖αac‖L∞(A).
Proof. The definition κ = z#ǫ yields κ([k¯−∆k, k¯]) = ǫ[z
−1([k¯−∆k, k¯])].
Now k¯ −∆k ≤ z(a, k) ≤ (1− θ)a+ θk¯ implies a ≥ k¯ − 1
1−θ
∆k. Thus
κ([k¯ −∆k, k¯]) ≤ ǫ
(
[a¯− 1
1−θ
∆k, a¯]× K¯
)
= α([a¯− 1
1−θ
∆k, a¯])
which is the desired bound (46).
For the measure ǫ to be positive assortative means its support spt ǫ is non-
decreasing. Except possibly for a countable number of jump discontinuities,
this support is then contained in the graph of some non-decreasing map
kt : A¯ → K¯. If α is free of atoms, the countable set of a where the jumps
occur is a set of measure zero. Then the formula ǫ = (id × kt)#α and
uniqueness of kt are well-known facts, established e.g. in Lemma 3.1 of [1] and
the main theorem of [13]. It follows that f(a) = z(a, kt(a)) is non-decreasing,
and pushes α forward to κ. By Lebesgue’s theorem, f ′(a) = 1 − θ + θk′t(a)
exists H1-a.e. and enjoys the positive lower bound f ′(a) ≥ 1 − θ. Thus f
is one-to-one and there is an inverse function g : K¯ −→ A¯ with Lipschitz
constant at most 1
1−θ
such that g(f¯(k)) = k for any non-decreasing extension
f¯ : K¯ −→ A¯ of f (to points where kt(a) may not be differentiable). For
K ′ ⊂ K¯ we have κ[K ′] = α[f−1(K ′)] = α[g(K ′)]. Taking K ′ to consist of
any single point shows κ has no atoms if α has no atoms. Taking K ′ to be an
arbitrary set of Lebesgue measure zero shows κ absolutely continuous with
respect to Lebesgue if α is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue,
noting H1[g(K ′)] ≤ 1
1−θ
H1[K ′]. The formula αac(a) = f ′(a)κac(f(a)) then
follows essentially from the fundamental theorem of calculus, and is argued
rigorously in [14]. The bound ‖κac‖L∞(K) ≤
1
1−θ
‖αac‖L∞(A) is a consequence,
so the proof is complete.
Theorem 15 (Positive assortative and unique optimizers) Fix c ≥ 0
and positive θ, θ′, N,N ′ and a¯ with max{θ, θ′} < 1 ≤ N . Set A = [0, a¯[ and
let α be a Borel probability measure on A¯ satisfying the doubling condition
(12) at a¯ ∈ sptα. Define z(a, k) = (1− θ)a+ θk, bθ = bE ◦ z and b
′
θ′(a, k) =
bL((1 − θ
′)a + θ′k) where bE/L ∈ C
1(K¯) satisfy (1)–(3). If ǫ, λ ≥ 0 on
A¯2 maximize the dual problem (11), then the labor matching λ is positive
assortative. Moreover, there exist a pair of maximizers (ǫ, λ) for which the
educational matching ǫ is also positive assortative.
If there exist minimizing payoffs (u, v) ∈ F0 for the dual problem (10)
which are non-decreasing and strictly convex, (as for example if either c > 0
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or Nθ2 ≥ 1), then any maximizing ǫ and λ are positive assortative. If, in
addition, α is free from atoms then the maximizing ǫ and λ are unique. If, in
addition, hypotheses (d)-(f) from Proposition 7 hold, then u′ and v′ exist and
are uniquely determined α-a.e. and (z#ǫ)-a.e. respectively. If, in addition,
α dominates some absolutely continuous measure whose support fills A¯, and
(u0, v0) ∈ F0 is any other minimizer with v0 : A −→ R locally Lipschitz then
u0 = u holds α-a.e., meaning u0 is unique.
Proof. Set K = [0, k¯[= A. Existence of a maximizing pair (ǫ, λ) is
asserted by Lemma 17. Let us begin by showing that they are positive
assortative under the extra condition that minimizing payoffs (u, v) exist for
(10) which are strictly convex. Lemma 5 asserts v(z(a, k)) is then strictly
supermodular.
Set f(a, k) = u(a) + v(k)
N
− cbE(z(a, k)) − v(z(a, k)) ≥ 0 and g(k
′, k) =
v(k′) + v(k)
N
− b′θ′(k
′, k)) ≥ 0 on A¯ × K¯, with the convention f(a¯, k¯) ≤ 0 if
v(k¯) = +∞, and vanishing if and only if u(a¯) = +∞ in addition. Corollary 9
asserts ǫ(f) = 0 and λ(g) = 0 for any dual maximizers (ǫ, λ). Thus ǫ and λ
must vanish outside the respective zero sets F ⊂ A¯× K¯ of f and G ⊂ K¯2 of
g.
When f and g are strictly submodular, then F and G are non-decreasing
in the plane, meaning λ and ǫ are positive assortative. This strict submod-
ularity follows from that of −bE(z(a, k)) and −v(z(a, k)).
Finally, assume in addition that α is atom free. If (ǫi, λi) are dual max-
imizers, for i = 0, 1, then so is their average (ǫ2, λ2) := (ǫ0 + ǫ1, λ0 + λ1)/2.
Thus ǫ2 vanishes outside the non-decreasing set F , as do ǫ0/1. Similarly λi
all vanish outside the same non-decreasing set G for i = 0, 1, 2. This strongly
suggests the asserted uniqueness, an intuition we now make precise. Except
perhaps for a countable number of vertical segments, the non-decreasing set
F is contained in the graph of a non-decreasing map kt : A¯ −→ K¯. Any
joint measure ǫ with ǫ1 = α cannot charge these vertical segments, since
this would imply α has atoms. Since our maximizers ǫi vanishes outside the
graph of kt, we conclude they must coincide with the measure (id×kt)#α by
Lemma 3.1 of [1]. This identification shows ǫ0 = ǫ1. The associated distri-
butions κ = z#ǫ0 and κt = (ǫ0)
2/N of adult and teacher skills are therefore
also unique. Moreover, κ is free from atoms, according to Lemma 14.
Let λ1i and λ
2
i be the left and right marginals of each maximizer λi ≥ 0
for the labor sector, whose feasibility implies λ1i + λ
2
i /N
′ = κ − κt is also
atom-free. Let ∆λ = λ0 − λ1 denote the difference of the two maximizers.
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Recall that both λi — and hence ∆λ — must vanish outside the same non-
decreasing set G. Just as before, the non-decreasing set G has at most
countably many horizontal and vertical segments, which λi cannot charge
since its marginals are free from atoms. Now the positive marginals ∆λ1+ :=
((∆λ)+)
1 = ((∆λ)1)+ and ∆λ
2
+ of the difference must have the same mass,
since the atom-free condition precludes cancellations. On the other hand,
feasibility implies N∆λ1+−N∆λ
1
−+∆λ
2
+−∆λ
2
− = 0, which forces N∆λ
1
+ =
∆λ2− (and N∆λ
1
− = ∆λ
2
+). Since these two measures have the same mass,
N 6= 1 produces a contradiction unless ∆λ = 0. If N = 1 so that all adults
are teachers, then λi = 0. This establishes the uniqueness asserted for the
dual problem.
Having established the existence of positive assortative maximizers when
v is strictly convex, we now turn to the case that strict convexity fails. Ac-
cording to Theorem 13, this happens only when c = 0 and Nθ2 < 1, so we
can approximate this situation as a c → 0 limit. Let (ǫc, λc) and (uc, vc) be
the (non-negative) optimizers described above for the problem with c > 0,
so that cǫc(bθ) + λc(b
′
θ′) = α(uc) according to Remark 10. Using the Banach-
Alaoglu theorem as in the proof of Lemma 17, and the compactness results of
Lemma 11, we extracting a subsequential limit (ǫc, λc)→ (ǫ, λ) in the weak-∗
topology on C(A¯×K¯)∗ and (uc, vc)→ (u, v) locally uniformly on [0, a0[, with
u(a) = +∞ = v(a) for all a > a0. The limiting pairs are feasible for the pri-
mal and dual problems respectively, and positive assortativity survives the
limiting process [13]. Fatou’s lemma allows us to take the subsequential limit
of cǫc(bθ) + λc(b
′
θ′) = α(uc) to arrive at λ(b
′
θ′) ≥ α(u). The reverse inequality
is asserted by Proposition 8, and confirms optimality of (ǫ, λ) by Corollary 9.
We now address uniqueness of the primal minimizers. Since u and v
are strictly convex, both are continuous functions with one-sided derivatives
throughout K, and two-sided derivatives except perhaps at countably many
points. Define u(a¯) = lima→a¯ u(a) and v(k¯) similarly. Since the measures α
and z#ǫ have no atoms, the asserted derivatives of u and v exist. Denote
the distribution of workers and managers by κw := π
1
#λ and κm := π
2
#λ/N
′.
The projections of spt ǫ through π1(a, k) = a and π2(a, k) = k are compact
sets of full measure for κw and κm respectively. Take Dom v
′ ⊂]0, k¯[ by
convention. For each k′ ∈ π1(spt λ) ∩ Dom v′, there is a unique k ∈ K¯
with (k′, k) ∈ spt λ ⊂ G. The first-order condition gk′(k
′, k) = 0 then gives
v′(k′) = (1 − θ′)b′L((1 − θ)k
′ + θk); by strict convexity of bL there cannot
be two such k without differentiability of v failing at k′. This shows v′ to
be uniquely determined by λ throughout π1(spt λ) ∩ Dom v′ — a set of full
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κw measure. A similar argument with the roles of k
′ and k interchanged
shows v′(k) = N ′θ′b′L((1− θ
′)k′ + θ′k) is uniquely determined by λ on the
set π2(spt λ) ∩Dom v′ containing κm-a.e. manager type k.
To address v′(k) for the teacher types k, assume hypotheses (d)-(f) of
Proposition 7. For k1 ∈ spt κt ∩ Dom v
′, that proposition provides a recur-
sive formula (21) asserting k2 ∈ Dom v
′, and relating v′(k1) to v
′(k2), where
(a1, k1) ∈ spt ǫ and k2 = z(a1, k1) is the skill of those adults who were trained
by type k1 teachers. The strict monotonicity of v
′(k) we have assumed im-
plies a1 and k2 are unique. The proposition also asserts that after a finite
number d of iterations, this recursion terminates with an adult of skill kd who
is willing to become a worker or a manager, and whose wage gradient v′(kd)
is therefore determined by the considerations above. Thus v′(k1) is uniquely
determined by ǫ, λ, and (22). This establishes the κ-a.e. uniqueness of the
wage gradient v′.
Finally, we turn to the net lifetime surplus u(a) of student type a ∈]0, a¯[.
For a ∈ π1(spt ǫ) ∩ Domu′, there exists k ∈ K¯ (which we’ll show to be
unique) such that (a, k) ∈ spt ǫ ⊂ F . The first-order conditions for one-sided
derivatives ±fa(a
±, k) ≥ 0 give
v′(z(a, k)−) + cb′E(z(a, k)
−) ≥
u′(a)
1− θ
≥ v′(z(a, k)+) + cb′E(z(a, k)
+).
However, the convexity of v on ]0, k¯[ assert v′(z−) ≤ v′(z+) and similarly for
bE , so both v and bE must be differentiable at z(a, k) and equalities hold
throughout. Thus
v′(z) + cb′E(z) =
1
1− θ
u′(a).
Since the left hand side is strictly increasing in z, we find z(a, k) and hence
k is unique. Since v′ was uniquely determined for z#ǫ adult type, it follows
that u′ is uniquely determined for α-a.e. student type. If α dominates some
absolutely continuous measure whose support fills A¯, this shows u is unique
up to an additive constant. Given another feasible minimizer (u0, v0) with
v0 locally Lipschitz, we see u0 must produce equality α-a.e. in the inequality
(37); otherwise replacing u0 by the right-hand side would remain feasible
and lower the objective (10). On the other hand, the right hand side is
locally Lipschitz, according to Lemma 2. The arguments above then yield
u0 = u + const. But the constant must vanish since both minimizers yield
the same value for the objective functional, showing u0 is unique in L
1(A¯, α).
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2.6 Phase transition to unbounded wage gradients
Having come this far, one may wonder whether establishing the existence of
competitive equilibria need be so involved. If we had been content to find
optimizing wages u and v which are merely non-decreasing, an argument
based on Helly’s selection theorem might have sufficed. However, we would
not then know the convexity of the wages (used to prove their uniqueness),
nor positive assortativity of the education sector.
In this section, we explore the actual behavior of v(k) near the top skill
type k¯, assuming the distribution of student types is given by a continuous
density α(da) = αac(a)da on A = K = [0, k¯[. Under mild differentiability
hypotheses, our next theorem establishes the existence of a phase transition
separating bounded from unbounded wage gradients. For Nθ > 1, it shows
the education sector may form into a pyramid scheme in which the marginal
wage v′(k) diverges to infinity as k → k¯, even though the absolute wage
v(k) remains bounded. For Nθ 6= 1, it gives precise asymptotics (48) for
the wage function v(k) and the endogenous distribution κac(k) of adult skills
near k¯. Notice this formula makes an explicit quantitative prediction for
the dependence of the rate of divergence on the teaching capacity N and
effectiveness θ assumed in the model. In all cases this divergence is integrable,
so the wages tend to a finite limit. For Nθ < 1 it predicts a specific limiting
slope v′(k)→ c/( 1
Nθ
−1) as k → k¯, while for Nθ > 1 it predicts v′(k)→∞ at
a specific rate. Thus the differences in marginal wages amongst the very top
echelons of teachers (‘gurus’) is negligible in a thin (or equivalently, vertical)
pyramid Nθ < 1, but becomes more and more exaggerated if Nθ > 1, and
at a rate which increases with Nθ, corresponding to a fatter and fatter (or
equivalently, more and more horizontal) organizational structure with wider
effective span of control. When the theorem applies, it also predicts that
the density of adults (= teachers) at the highest skill level k¯ = a¯ tends to a
constant multiple 1−θ/N
1−θ
of the density of students.
Theorem 16 (Wage behavior and density of top-skilled adults) Fix
c ≥ 0 and positive θ, θ′, N,N ′ and a¯ = k¯ with max{θ, θ′} < 1 ≤ N . Let α
be given by a Borel probability density αac ∈ L∞(A) which is continuous and
positive at the upper endpoint of A = [0, a¯[. Set z(a, k) = (1 − θ)a + θk,
bθ = bE ◦ z and b
′
θ′(a, k) = bL((1 − θ
′)a + θ′k), where bE/L ∈ C
1(K¯) satisfy
(1)–(3). Suppose (ǫ, λ) and convex (u, v) ∈ F0 optimize the primal and dual
problems (10)–(11), and (i) k¯ ∈ (spt ǫ2) \ spt(λ1 + λ2), meaning all adults
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with sufficiently high skills become teachers; (ii) the educational matching ǫ
is positive assortative, meaning a non-decreasing correspondence k = kt(a)
relates the ability of α-a.e. student a to that of his teacher; (iii) kt is differ-
entiable at a¯, and (iv) v is differentiable on some interval ]k¯ − δ, k¯[. Then
for Nθ 6= 1,
v′(k) =
const
|k¯ − k|
logNθ
logN
−
cb¯′E
1− 1
Nθ
+ o(1) (48)
as k → k¯, and the steady state distribution κ = z#ǫ of adult skills satisfies
κac
(
k¯
)
:= lim
δ→0
1
δ
∫ k¯
k¯−δ
κ(dk) =
1− θ/N
1− θ
αac(a¯). (49)
Proof. As in Lemma 14, hypothesis (ii) implies some non-decreasing
function kt : A→ K gives the equilibrium matching of students with teach-
ers, so that kg(a) = (1 − θ)a + θkt(a) gives the matching of student ability
with human capital acquired when the student grows up. Then (kg)#α = κ
and (kt)#α = Nκt, where κ = κm + κm/N
′ + κt/N gives the distribution of
adult skill types on K, as a sum of the distributions of worker, manager and
teacher skill types. Now
Nk′t(a)κ
ac
t (kt(a)) = α
ac(a), (50)
and k′g(a)κ
ac(kg(a)) = α
ac(a) (51)
is known to hold for a.e. a ∈ A¯. In particular, techniques of [14] can be used
to show it holds at a = a¯ provided k′t(a¯) (and hence k
′
g(a¯)) exists (iii) and
are non-vanishing. On the other hand, the upper bound ‖κac‖L∞ <∞ from
Lemma 14 gives a positive lower bound for k′t(a) near a¯ a.e. in (50), which
precludes the possibility that k′t(a¯) = 0.
From (i) and the steady state constraint κ = λ1 + 1
N ′
λ2 + 1
N
ǫ2 we have
kt(a¯) = k¯ = kg(a¯) and κ
ac(a¯) = κact (a¯). From (50)–(51) we concludeNk
′
t(a¯) =
k′g(a¯). On the other hand, differentiating kg(a) = (1 − θ)a + θkt(a) yields
k′g(a¯) = 1+ θ(k
′
t(a¯)− 1) ≥ 1− θ. Solving this linear system of two equations
in two unknowns gives k′t(a¯) =
1−θ
N−θ
and
k′g(a¯) =
1− θ
1− θ/N
; (52)
(51) now implies (49).
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Next we consider the equilibrium wage v(k) of each type of adult and
payoff u(a) to each type of student. The stability constraint asserts u(a) +
1
N
v(k) − v(z(a, k)) − cbE(z(a, k)) ≥ 0 for all a and k, with equality holding
when k = kt(a) = θ
−1kg(a) + (1−
1
θ
)a. The first-order condition in k for this
non-negative function to attain its minimum gives
v′
(
kg(a)− (1− θ)a
θ
)
= (v′(kg(a)) + cb
′
E(kg(a)))Nθ.
Taylor expanding kg(a¯−∆a) = k¯ − k
′
g(a¯)∆a+ o(∆a) using k
′
g(a¯) from (52),
we find a recursive relation for v′(k) near k¯:
v′
(
k¯ − 1−θ
N−θ
∆a+ o(∆a)
)
= Nθ[v′ + cb′E ]k=k¯− 1−θ
1−θ/N
∆a+o(∆a).
Neglecting the o(∆a) terms and setting b¯′Ef(x) := v
′(k¯−x)/c+(1− 1
Nθ
)−1b¯′E−
(1− 1
N2θ
)−1b′′E(k¯)x, the recursion simplifies to f(
x
N
) = Nθf(x) which is solved
by constant multiples of f(x) = x− log(Nθ)/ logN . Thus, to leading order
v′(k¯ −∆k) = const|∆k|−
logNθ
logN −
cb¯′E
1− 1
Nθ
+
cb′′E(k¯)
1− 1
N2θ
∆k.
Either the first or the second summand dominates this expression as ∆k → 0,
depending on the sign of Nθ−1. One might worry that const depends on the
sequence along which the recursion is solved, but forNθ > 1 the monotonicity
of v′ precludes this, to yield the desired identity (48).
Some remarks concerning hypotheses (i)–(iv): Proposition 7 ensures (i)
holds if N ′θ′ and Nθ are large enough, while Theorem 15 ensures (ii) holds
when c > 0, and can be selected otherwise. We do not know conditions which
guarantee (iii)-(iv), since differentiability may fail for kt(a) on a set of zero
measure, and for v(k) at a countable number of points. We can however,
ensure that kt is bi-Lipschitz by combining the lower bound on its derivative
from Lemma 14 with the upper bound provided by Proposition 7 in case
Nθ ≥ 1. This makes failure of (iii) seem unlikely, since the value of k′t(a)
would have to oscillate between these positive bounds, producing a reciprocal
oscillation in κ(k) near k¯. Similarly, the alternative to (iv) is that jump
discontinuities in the monotone function v′(k) accumulate at k¯. At least one
of the three types of singular behavior must occur, and (48) seems the most
likely, especially given its consistency with the divergence (22) predicted by
Proposition 7. To be absolutely correct, however, one should say Theorem 16
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provides strong evidence in favor of a phase transition with wage gradients
diverging if and only if Nθ ≥ 1, where the leading order behavior of (48)
changes. The theorem also provides concrete quantitative predictions which
can be investigated numerically.
A Optimal plans and absence of a duality gap
This appendix establishes the existence of measures achieving the maximum
LP ∗(δ) in the original (11) and δ-perturbed dual problem (24), and verifies
the absence LP ∗(δ) = LP∗(δ) of a duality gap. While such claims are natural
analogs to duality results well-known in finite-dimensional linear program-
ming, in our infinite-dimensional context they will remain true only if we are
careful to choose the correct functional analytic setting. These choices are
made clear in the proofs of the following statements.
Lemma 17 (Existence of optimal measures) Fix δ, cδ non-negative and
θ, θ′, N,N ′ positive with max{θ, θ′} ≤ 1 ≤ N and N ≥ 1. Let α be a Borel
probability measure on A¯, where A = [0, a¯[= K with 0 < a¯ = k¯ ∈ sptα, and
define z(a, k) = (1− θ)a+ θk, bθ = bE ◦ z and b
′
θ′(a, k) = bL((1− θ
′)a+ θ′k),
where bE/L ∈ C
0(K¯). Then there exist feasible measures ǫδ ≥ 0 and λδ ≥ 0
on A¯2 maximizing the dual problem (24).
Proof. As we now describe, existence of a maximizing ǫ and λ fol-
lows from a standard compactness and continuity argument. The continu-
ous functions C(A¯2) on the compact square A¯2 form a Banach space when
equipped with the supremum norm ‖ · ‖∞. Borel probability measures form
a weak-∗ compact subset of the dual Banach space, according to the Riesz-
Markov and Banach-Alaoglu theorems. A sequence ǫi → ǫ∞ converges in the
weak-∗ topology if and only if the integral ǫi(f) of each continuous function
f ∈ C(A¯2) against ǫi converges to the integral of f against ǫ∞. Feasibility of
λ, ǫ ≥ 0 asserts
〈fδ〉A +
∫
A¯
f(a)α(da) =
∫
A¯×K¯
f(a)ǫ(da, dk) and∫
K¯2
[f(k′) + 1
N ′
f(k)]λ(dk′, dk) = 〈fδ〉K +
∫
A¯×K¯
[f(z(a, k))− 1
N
f(k)]ǫ(da, dk)
for each f ∈ C(A¯). Thus the feasible pairs form a weak-∗ compact subset of
C(A¯2)∗. Since bθ, b
′
θ′ ∈ C(A¯
2), the linear functional we are trying to maximize
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is weak-∗ continuous, hence its maximum must be attained, provided the set
of feasible measures (ǫ, λ) is non-empty. To see the feasible set is non-empty,
let ǫ concentrate on the diagonal: ǫ = (id × id)#(α +
δ
|A|
H1|A). Then the
marginals ǫ1 = ǫ2 of ǫ coincide with κ := z#ǫ = α+
δ
|A|
H1|A, since z(a, a) = a.
Choosing λ := 1−1/N
1+1/N ′
ǫ+ 1
1+1/N ′
(id× id)#(
δ
|A|
H1|A) defines a feasible pair.
The next theorem addresses the absence of a duality gap. It is proved
using generalization of the Fenchel-Rockafellar duality theorem found in Bor-
wein and Zhu [3] (and pointed out to us by Yann Brenier). As in the preced-
ing lemma, the Fenchel-Rockafellar theorem will involve the duality between
measures and continuous, bounded functions. On the other hand, LP∗(δ) is
necessarily defined by an infimum over a larger class of functions Fδ includ-
ing some unbounded ones. Thus the Fenchel-Rockafellar theorem by itself
yields only an inequality LP∗(δ) ≤ LP
∗(δ) and not the desired equality.
Fortunately, the complementary inequality is established in Proposition 8.
Theorem 18 (No duality gap) Fix δ, cδ non-negative and θ, θ
′, N,N ′ and
a¯ = k¯ positive with max{θ, θ′} ≤ 1 ≤ N . Let A = [0, a¯[= K and α be a
Borel probability measure on A¯ satisfying the doubling condition (12) at a¯,
and define z(a, k) = (1−θ)a+θk, bθ = bE◦z and b
′
θ′(a, k) = bL((1−θ
′)a+θ′k)
where bE/L ∈ C(K¯). Then the values LP
∗(δ) = LP∗(δ) of the infimum (23)
and supremum (24) coincide.
Proof. Let H : Z −→ Z∗ be a bounded linear transformation between
a Banach space Z and its dual Z∗, on which convex functions ϕ : Z −→
R ∪ {+∞} and φ : Z∗ −→ R ∪ {+∞} are defined. Let Domϕ := {z ∈ Z |
ϕ(z) <∞}. Define the Legendre transform φ∗ of φ by
φ∗(z) := sup
z∗∈Z∗
〈z, z∗〉 − φ(z∗) (53)
on z ∈ Z and analogously ϕ∗ on Z∗. Here 〈z, z∗〉 denotes the duality pairing.
If φ is continuous and real-valued at some point in H(Domϕ), then pp.
135-137 of [3] asserts
inf
z∈Z
ϕ(z) + φ(Hz) = max
z∗∈Z∗
−ϕ∗(H∗z∗)− φ∗(−z∗).
In our case
ϕδ(u, v) = δ〈u+ v〉A +
∫
[0,a¯]
u(a)α(da)
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so
ϕ∗δ(µ, ν) =
{
0 if (µ, ν) = (α + δ
|A|
H1|A,
δ
|K|
H1|K)
+∞ else,
while
φ(u˜, v˜) =
{
0 if u˜ ≥ cδbθ and v˜ ≥ b
′
θ′
+∞ else;
so
φ∗(ǫ, λ) =
{
cδǫ(bθ) + λ(b
′
θ′) if ǫ ≤ 0 and λ ≤ 0
+∞ else;
and H : C(A¯)⊕ C(K¯) −→ C(A¯× K¯)⊕ C(K¯ × K¯) is given by
H
(
u
v
)
=
(
u(a) + 1
N
v(k)− v(z(a, k))
v(k′) + 1
N ′
v(k)
)
,
so that
H∗
(
ǫ
λ
)
=
(
ǫ1
λ1 + 1
N ′
λ2 + 1
N
ǫ2 − z#ǫ
)
.
Notice ϕ is continuous, while taking u, v large and constant makes φ ◦ H
finite. With these definitions (53) therefore asserts:
LP∗(δ) ≤ inf
u∈C(A¯)
v∈C(K¯)
ϕδ(u, v) + φ(H(u, v))
= max
ǫ≥0 on A¯×K¯
λ≥0 on K¯×K¯
−ϕ∗δ(H
∗(ǫ, λ))− φ∗(−ǫ,−λ)
= LP ∗(δ).
Here we have an inequality rather than the desired equality because the defi-
nition of LP∗(δ) involves minimizing over a broader class of feasible functions
(23) which need neither be continuous nor bounded. For such functions how-
ever, Proposition 8 asserts the opposite inequality, to conclude the proof of
the theorem.
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